A Modest Proposal: The Statutory "No-

Cause" Alternative to Wrongful
Discharge in California

ELLIS T. PRINCE III*

After concluding that Californiawrongful discharge case law has
produced a varied and inconsistent set of rules, Professor Prince
proposes a statutory alternative to discharge litigation. The proposed statute avoids the question of 'ust" versus "wrongful" discharge altogether by establishing a "no-cause" discharge option
for employers and employees. This option would allow the employer to terminate the employee without cause upon payment of a
statutorily calculated discharge payment, thereby addressing the
interests of the at will employee as well as the right of the employer to terminate at will.
INTRODUCTION

Employment at will" -

the doctrine recognizing an employer's

contractual freedom to discharge an employee without cause or justification 2 - is generally treated by legal writers as an unsolved, peculiarly hardy, legally sanctioned crime. Article after article returns
us to the at will scene. The doctrine's dubious historical origins and
* Assistant Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. B.A., 1974, Yale
University; J.D., 1977, University of Virginia. The author gratefully acknowledges the
invaluable assistance of John F. D'Amanda and Cheryl Knoerschild in the research and
preparation of this Article.
1. See Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will - Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 201, 201-02 n.4 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Limiting the Right].
2. In fact, the doctrine applies equally to the right of an employee to depart
from the employment relationship at will and without cause. The law of at will termination, however, focuses on the liability of the employer who discharges an employee without the employee's willingness or consent. See infra note 16.
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pernicious logic are recited, and the hue and cry is raised to excise it
from the law of contracts. We are routinely reassured that the end is
near, or ought to be.'
In fact, the once unconditional right of an employer to discharge a
worker for any reason, or for no reason at all, is now significantly
qualified and compromised at both the federal and state levels. Congress and state legislatures have defined an ever-expanding number
of unlawful causes for discharge. California courts have been at the
forefront of a parallel and concurrent attack by the judiciary at both
the federal and state levels. The state's courts have turned interpretive somersaults to find public policy protecting employees from discharge, and the cases have developed a host of different theories to
compensate the unfairly terminated worker."
Yet the right to terminate an employee at will endures at the federal level, and in all the states." In California, where employment at
will enjoys the unusual status of explicit statutory declaration,7 the
doctrine has undergone intense judicial scrutiny, highlighted by a se3. There is a developing and noteworthy countercurrent in the literature recognizing the merit of the employment at will doctrine, and the problems caused by legislative and judicial expansion of employee protection from wrongful discharge. See, e.g.,
Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment At Will Rule, 5
INDUs. REL L.J. 471 (1983) (arguing that judicial and legislative efforts to change the
rule have been ineffective, and that employees must look primarily to the collective bargaining process to obtain meaningful protection from unjust dismissal); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. C. L. REV. 947 (1984) (contending that at will
discharge should not be judged by occasional cases in which it produces wrongful discharge, but as an efficient, usually justifiable private response to labor problems through
contract); Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract:An Interest
and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1984) [hereinafter Harrison, An
Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis] (noting that the increase in job security associated
with employee protection laws and wrongful discharge litigation will probably be paid for
disproportionately by workers with low skills and few alternative employment opportunities); Harrison, The Price of the Public Policy Modification of the Terminable-at-Will
Employment: A Review of the Case Law From Management's Viewpoint, 51 U. CIN. L.
REV. 616 (1982); Note, Limiting the Right, supra note 1. See generally Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) (suggesting that there is
no economically justifiable need for the paternalism reflected in employee protections
limiting freedom of contract).
4. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
6. Id.
7. California Labor Code section 2922 states: "[a]n employment, having no
specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.
Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one
month." CAL LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1986).
The current version of the statute has undergone a series of amendments, but in its
current form is almost identical to the original statute from which it is derived. Section
1999 of the old California Civil Code read: "[a]n employment having no specified term
may be terminated at the will of either party, on notice to the other, except where otherwise provided by this Title." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1999 (1872) (amended by 1915 Cal.
Stat. 720; 1937 Cal. Stat. 261; 1969 Cal. Stat. 3123; 1971 Cal. Stat. 3186; 1971 Cal.
Stat. 3459).
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ries of important recent decisions. It has emerged from that judicial
gauntlet newly qualified but conceptually intact, its continued existence in the workplace reaffirmed.
The California cases highlight a developing paradox in the law of
wrongful discharge: courts and the legislature narrow the permissible
bounds of at will termination, but they resolutely refuse or fail to
outlaw the doctrine altogether. In so doing, they confirm the legitimacy of an employer's right to "fire at will" unless prohibited by
statute or contract. Employment at will, in its modified form, is more
firmly entrenched than ever in California employment law.
This Article thus proceeds from the increasingly apparent observation that the doctrine of employment at will has survived its harshest
critics, and seems certain to endure in the workplace in the absence
of discriminatory, retaliatory, or similar clearly defined unjust causes
for discharge. The Article avoids the continuing debate as to
whether at will termination is just or defensible, in favor of a more
relevant inquiry: first, how the current law distinguishes wrongful
from permissible at will termination; and second, how the legislative
and judicial interests in employee protection can be reconciled with
the insistently surviving at will concept.
The Article briefly reviews the origins of employment at will in
California. 8 It next examines the principal cases defining the socalled "California Rule" for wrongful discharge. It suggests that
there is no such coherent rule, but rather a series of varied and inconsistent theories of wrongful discharge that are of little predictive
value in determining whether an at will employee's termination will
be adjudged lawful or wrongful. 9
This Article then introduces a proposal for avoiding this inconsistency in the wrongful discharge case law. 10 It proposes that employers and employees be subject to a statutory alternative to discharge
litigation, allowing them to avoid the question of just versus wrongful cause altogether. The proposed statute would establish for qualifying parties a "no-cause discharge" option, allowing the employer
to terminate the employee without cause upon payment of a statutorily calculated discharge payment. The discharge payment amount
would vary according to certain employee-specific variables which,
for the most part, already have been recognized as significant in the
California discharge cases.
8. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.

9. See infra notes 20-101 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 102-33 and accompanying text.

The no-cause discharge proposal would accomodate the interests
of the at will employee as well as the right of the employer to terminate at will. It presents an efficient alternative to litigation, but
would not preclude employers or employees from electing instead to
pursue the discharge controversy in the courts. Its advantage would
derive from its provision to employees of a reasonable "buy-out" offer for discharge, and to employers a reliable calculation of the costs
of discharge.
AT WILL TERMINATION IN CALIFORNIA

A Brief Historical Overview

The literature abounds with analyses tracing the development of
the at will termination rule in the United States, at both the federal
and state levels. 11 At worst, the rule is recognized as a product of
analytical error, manipulative jurisprudence, and the pervasive domination by industry of an unorganized workforce. At best, it is characterized as a curious misappropriation of freedom of contract, out
of which has evolved a more enlightened notion of employment as a
right, entitlement, or property interest which once acquired cannot
be revoked by an employer except under specific, delineated, increasingly unusual circumstances.
There is much to substantiate the thesis of historical error. It is
now commonly accepted that the American rule permitting terminable at will employment derives from a single, century-old treatise12
that misappropriated English master-servant law, and miscited leading contemporary American cases:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie the hiring-at-will and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. The hiring at so much a
day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring,
and no presumption attaches that it was for a13day even, but only at the rate
fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
11. See, e.g., Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Feinman,
The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LErAL HIST. 118 (1976);
Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo
ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Discharge: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Note: Guidelinesfor a Public Policy Exception to
the Employment At Will Rule, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1980); Note, ProtectingAt Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter Note, ProtectingAt Will Employees]; Note,
Recognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Employment - The California
Cause of Action for Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAc. L.J. 69 (1980); Note, A Common Law
Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 1435 (1975); Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974) [hereinafter
Note, Implied Contract Rights].
12. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (2d ed. 1886).
13. Id. For a more thorough discussion of Wood and the English cases upon
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Dubious as its origins may have been, the so-called Wood's Rule
enjoyed Supreme Court adoption and constitutional support at one
time. 14 The doctrine affirmed essential nineteenth-century laissez-

faire economic principles, and endured as an attractive reflection of

free market doctrine in the employment marketplace. 15 Certainly it
tended to support industry control over the workforce in that market.
which Wood relied, see Professor Feinman's historical analysis in Feinman, supra note
11, at 122-27.
Similarly unequivocal language has historically defined the at will relationship in California, as illustrated by an early California Supreme Court opinion:
Precisely as may the employee cease labor at his whim or pleasure, and,
whatever be his reason, good, bad, or indifferent, leave no one a legal right to
complain; so, upon the other hand, may the employer discharge, and whatever
be his reason good, bad, or indifferent, no one has suffered a legal wrong ....
These views touching the reciprocal arbitrary right of the employer to employ
or discharge labor, without regard in either case to the actuating motives, are
propositions settled beyond peradventure.
Union Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554-55, 112 P.
886, 888 (1910).
14. In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the United States Supreme
Court declared that an employee protection statute prohibiting the discharge of railroad
workers because of their union membership was unlawful. The Court reasoned that "the
right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the
same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of
such employee." Id. at 174-75. The Court thus upheld the concept of employment at will
on the theory of mutuality: because the employee could cease working at any time, the
employer had a mutual right and remedy of discharge at any time. It concluded:
In the absence . . . of a valid contract between the parties controlling their
conduct towards each other and fixing a period of service, it cannot be...
that an employer is under any legal obligation, against his will, to retain an
employee in his personal service any more than an employee can be compelled,
against his will, to remain in the personal service of another.
Id. at 175-76.
The Court applied the same reasoning seven years later to invalidate a state statute
that prohibited employers from refusing to employ union members, applying the rule to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915),
the Court considered and dispensed with the argument that the employer's superior bargaining power deprived the parties of mutuality in fact, recognizing as legitimate those
"inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise [of contract freedom]." Id. at 17.
The Court finally acknowledged the authority of Congress to prohibit employee discharge in order to protect union activity in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 301
U.S. 1 (1937), when it upheld the constitutionality of the anti-union discharge prohibitions in the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act, Act of July 5, 1935, codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982)). Even then, the Court's departure from the theory of mutuality and the right of an employer to terminate at will was qualified, as it cautioned
that "the [National Labor Relations] Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercised for other
reasons than [employee] intimidation and coercion." Id. at 46.
15. See Feinman, supra note 11, at 131-35; Summers, supra note 11, at 484-86;
Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 11, at 342-43, 346-47.

Courts and legislatures, however, have spent the past hundred
years encroaching upon at will discharge, responding to the actual
and potential abuses that at will employees have suffered at the
hands of an employer free to discharge at will. There are abundant
summaries of the congressional and state legislative "employee protection" statutes which prohibit the dismissal of an employee for specific unjust causes.16
16. Federal legislation now extensively protects employees from termination
through statutes prohibiting discharge for various unlawful causes. The National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982), forbids discrimination, including discharge,
based on an employee's union participation or membership, or in retaliation for bringing
a claim authorized by the statute. See supra note 14. Section 703(a) of title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2)(a) (1982), bars any discharge based on
race, color, religion, sex or national origin; section 704(a) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3)(a)
(1982)), similarly prohibits discharge for asserting claims under the Act. These two statutes represent the most significant federal encroachments on employer termination rights,
and have given rise to a number of parallel statutory protections in more specific areas of
congressional concern. The more significant of them are summarized below.
Section 304 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a)(1982), prohibits discharge because of wage garnishment for a single debt. Section 4(a) of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982), prohibits discriminatory discharges of older workers. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), prohibits discrimination, including discharge from employment, solely because of pregnancy. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982), forbids the exclusion or discharge of otherwise qualified handicapped workers. Section 6(a) of the Jury System Improvements Acts of 1978, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1875 (1982), disallows employers from discriminating against or discharging (permanent) employees who serve on federal juries. Once a civil service employee has successfully completed a probationary period of employment, the employee may be discharged
"only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" as set forth in the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, § 204(a), 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982). And, though its
provisions are now essentially outdated, the Vietnam era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1982) required the reemployment and prohibited the discharge without cause of honorably discharged Vietnam veterans.
Various federal statutes adopted the antiretaliatory approach of the labor and civil
rights legislation statutes, by prohibiting the discharge of employees for exercising their
statutory rights. Among these are the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982); the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982);
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1982); the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (1982); and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
Tracking employment at will at the state level is a bit more complicated, and reveals a
hybrid of federal preemption, some statutory modelling after the various proscriptive federal provisions, and a great deal of judicial declaration where the state legislature has
failed to act. Fair employment practice statues and human rights laws, fashioned after
the federal labor and civil rights laws, are now widespread in the states. Like the federal
counterparts, these statutes generally contain prohibitions against retaliatory discharge
for employee activity in pursuit of the statutory rights involved. In addition, roughly
three-fifths of the states now provide some additional antiretaliatory protection to employees, for such reasons as jury service, voting, wage garnishment, military service, or
"whistleblowing," that is, reporting employer violations of a wide range of laws or
regulations.
Numerous treatises have surveyed, catalogued, and summarized the wandering path of
at will discharge throughout the states. For a thorough and complete analysis of state
statutes protecting employees and modifying employment at will, see L. LARSON & P.
BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL §§ 10.01-.53 (1985); see also Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 544

[VOL 24: 137, 1987]

Wrongful Discharge Alternative
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Tracking the various state court interpretations of these statutes,
or judicial response to the at will issue in states without comprehensive employee protection laws, is more troublesome. This tracking
reveals the lack of any single judicial trend in defining the permissible boundaries of at will termination. A detailed survey of the state
cases is necessarily beyond the scope of this Article.
State court review does reveal one singularly significant fact: while
there is no longer any general common-law at will rule in the aftermath of a century of encroachment upon Wood's Rule, employment
at will remains a qualified but legitimate term of employment in all
1
of the states, and in federal employment law. " Judicial and legislative attention to the question at the state level has expanded the dif(1982).
17.

For a state-by-state analysis of termination at will cases, see L. LARSON & P.
supra note 16, §§ 3.01-4.10; H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 121-218 (1984); 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) §§ 170.501-.690 (1984).
A survey of the cases reveals that termination at will shares some definitional and
theoretical common ground in the states, and that California faithfully reflects those
common elements. First, there is the model of the terminable at will relationship: a contractual agreement between employer and worker which either specifies, or is subject to
the reasonable implication, that the employee may be dismissed for any reason.
Where no statute expressly prohibits such a dismissal, the case law in the states suggests three general theories of liability for wrongful discharge emerging to protect the
employee despite inexplicit or nonexistent legislative protection. The first theory of liability recognizes that the employee has been damaged because the employer has violated
public policy - not an express prohibition against discharge, but some more fundamental, implied standard of contractual behavior - and should make reparation for the
harm done. This is the "public policy" exception to an otherwise permissible at will
relationship.
The second theory establishes liability based upon a showing that the parties "contracted out" of an arguably permissible at will relationship, into a modified relationship
that now cannot be terminated except for cause. Alternatively, the employee may be held
to have justifiably believed this has occurred, and reasonably relied on that belief to his
subsequent detriment. This theory is generally recognized as a contract analysis, although malicious or wrongful behavior by the employer can be the basis of concurrent or
independent tort liability.
Finally, a theory has developed recognizing an employer's independent covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship, created either by statute or
judicial inference. The breach of this covenant has been recognized as both a tort and
contract issue, and is an independent, more general basis for wrongful discharge liability.
For a more extensive discussion of the use in California of these three theories of
liability, see infra notes 20-101 and accompanying text.
Two corollary trends in the states are also worth noting. First, in no jurisdiction is
there a clear, absolute statutory prohibition against termination at will. By either statute
or case law, some accomodation of the doctrine exists in every state.
Just as significantly, the other extreme does not apply. No state has accepted unconditionally, and without restriction, the premise that an employer should be authorized to
discharge an employer for any cause or no cause. Every state, either through judicial
opinion or legislation, has developed some exceptions to the doctrine resulting in the employer's liability to civil suit or criminal prosecution.
BOROWSKY,

ferences between various state versions of at will employment, but

the doctrine's national demise continues to be greatly exaggerated.
CaliforniaLabor Code Section 2922 and the Development of

Public Policy Exceptions

California courts have long been at the forefront of the trend toward expanding wrongful discharge liability, and limiting the employer's right to terminate an employee at will. California's active
history of employee protection is curious and specially significant in
light of its unique at will statute, Labor Code section 2922.18 Section
2922 defines, authorizes, and in the absence of a contract term to the
contrary, presumes an employment relationship to be terminable at
will. Notwithstanding the unambiguous language and clear intent of
the statute, its application in questions of at will discharge has never
been absolute. The California Legislature has expressly prohibited
the dismissal of employees for a number of specific unlawful
causes, 19 and the state courts have routinely applied these statutory
prohibitions to at will employees without regard to section 2922.20 At
the same time, the case law has imposed a series of additional exceptions to the rule, based upon judicial interpretation of a general public policy implied by various statutes. 2 1 Thus, the history of at will
employee discharge in California has become progressively more
complicated, and the state of the law progressively more obscure, as
18. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1986); see also supra note 7. Five states
other than California recognize the at will rule by statute: Georgia, Louisiana, Montana,
North Dakota, and South Dakota. The effect of the statutes varies, but nowhere is state
legislation permitting at will discharge as subject to exception and qualification as in
California.
19. California has prohibited employee discharge in numerous provisions of the
Labor Code, as well as in other codes, and the courts have interpreted the statutes to
apply to the at will employee. As recognized by the supreme court in Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980), the list of
prohibited causes now includes discharge for refusal to commit perjury, Petermann v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); discharge
because of union membership and activity, Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192
Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961); and discharge for designation of a nonunion
bargaining representative, Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1970). See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
A court of appeal decision in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), additionally recognized the following statutory prohibitions:
discharge for seeking or exercising rights to safe working conditions (Mason v. Lyl Productions, 69 Cal. 2d 79, 443 P.2d 193, 69 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1968) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 6311 (West Supp. 1986)); for asserting certain civil rights, including participation in
elections and service as a juror (CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 230 (West Supp. 1986); CAL,
ELEC. CODE § 1650 (Vest Supp. 1986)); for garnishment of wages (CAL. LAB. CODE §
2929 (West Supp. 1986)); for seeking the protection of minimum wage laws for women
and minors (CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197 (West Supp. 1986)); and to prevent age discrmination (CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1420.1, 1420.15 (West Supp. 1986)).
20. See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 38-99 and accompanying text.
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judicial exceptions to and qualifications of section 2922 have redefined and progressively eroded the once clear meaning of the statute.
In a series of cases beginning in 1949, California courts effectively
abolished the distinction between at will employees and those hired
for a specific term, where employee protection legislation prohibited
discharge for specific causes. In 1949, a court of appeal in the case
of Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard2 2 interpreted Election
Code section 69523 to be equally applicable to term and at will employees. The court saw no conflict between the Election Code provision, which prohibited employers from suspending or firing employees for missing work to serve as election officers, and section 2922 of
the Labor Code, which allowed the discharge of at will employees
for any reason. It thus established the election provision as a deliberate exception to the general rule of at-will dismissal. 24 The court reasoned that "[n]o reason is advanced by respondents [Shipyards], and
term should be
none suggests itself, why an employee for a specified 25
protected, while an employee at will should not be."
22. 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949).
Kouff, though he had worked for the Shipyard for more than a year, was recognized as
a terminable at will employee. He did not contest this characterization, arguing rather
that the protections of the Election Code applied to at will employees.
23. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 695 (West 1975) (current version at CAL. ELEC. CODE §
1655 (West. Supp. 1986)). The original statute read in part:
Any election officer may, on the day of an election at which he is serving,
absent himself from any service or employment in which he is then engaged or
employed. He shall not, because of so absenting himself, be liable to any penalty, nor shall any deduction be made made from his usual salary or wages, nor
shall he be suspended or discharged from his service or employment.
24. The court stated, "[g]ranting that under the general law an employee at will
may be discharged without any cause, this particular statute interposes an exception to
that rule, the basis of which is the necessity of drawing on industry for such temporary
public servants as election officers." Kouff, 90 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 202 P.2d at 1061. On
that basis, the court allowed Kouff a damage recovery for lost wages and punitive dam-

ages. Id.

25. Id. The court correctly noted that the Shipyard failed to provide an equitable
argument sufficient to support a distinction between its term and at will employees. Nevertheless, its reading is the simplest, clearest, least ambiguous interpretation of section
695, and one that did not seem to require equitable support. The statute does not distinguish between types of employees. However, it does refer to the worker's "usual salary or
wages," implying that the provision applies to those employees for whom the term "usual
wage" would be meaningful. This would certainly include term employees. As for the
temporary or short-term worker, the term is not so obviously applicable.
The court's holding might alternatively have focused on whether Kouff, though dismissible at will, had worked long enough to be recognized as earning a usual salary or wage.
That analysis would have brought him within the purview of the statute, as well as presaging the California Supreme Court's approach thirty-one years later in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). See
infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.

The significance of the Kouff decision cannot be understated. It
represented the first time a court had abandoned the clear and abso-

lute meaning of section 2922, in favor of a specific definition of the
"public good" in a worker protection statute. Once the court characterized the case as posing an "either-or" choice between allowing a
malicious dismissal, or extending arguably applicable statutory protection to an abused worker, its choice to support the public policy
behind the statute was predictable. The Kouff case invited at will
employees into the zones of protection created by all similar employee protection statutes.26

Just as significantly, Kouff introduced the concept that the emIn any case, the court failed to discuss or account for the clear language of CAL. LAB.
CODE § 2922, which does distinguish between the terminable at will employee and one
employed for a specified term. Section 2922, applied to Kouff, suggests that if Kouff was
an at will employee, he was terminable at will; if not, he was protected under section 695
of the Election Code. The court of appeal cited no authority to support its conclusion
that CAL. ELEC. CODE § 695 was intended as an exception to the at will rule, and neither
legislative history nor the case law substantiates its peculiar declaration that section 2922
was to be qualified and preempted by such worker protection statutes. See infra note 33.
26. Reconciling section 2922 with section 695 of the Election Code, or with similar no-discharge laws, could have taken several less strained interpretive paths. Any of
the alternatives would have retained the integrity of section 2922, rather than virtually
voiding it.
The simplest approach would have been simply to read section 2922 strictly, as applying to a specially defined category of at will employees for whom an employer's freedom
to discharge would remain absolute. Employees contractually promised a term of employment would constitute as a discrete and separate class of worker, subject to different
equitable expectations from at will employees and to separate statutory attention and
protection.
So interpreted, section 2922 would be limited in its application to employees hire for
an indefinite employment term. Statutes prohibiting discharge, by contrast, would apply
to permanent or term employees. In cases in which an employee protection statute made
no distinction between the at will and definite term employee, the presence of section
2922 would establish a predecessory rule regarding the at will worker. The election code
provision at issue in Kouff did not except at will employees explicitly from the preexisting
at will statute, and it is difficult to recognize any such exception as implied. It is even
more difficult to accept the court's reasoning that an employer should be responsible for
showing why it should not be implied.
Alternatively, a court considering whether to protect at will employees from discharge
notwithstanding section 2922 could simply presume than a worker was an employee for a
specified term, absent explicit contract language defining the employee's status as at will.
This approach would require an employer to clarify the termination provisions in its employment agreements with workers, at the peril of having ambiguous terms resolved in
the employee's favor. In order to protect clearly defined at will employees from discharge
for reasons recognized as inimical to public policy, the legislature would be required to
include them specifically in future employee protection statutes. Otherwise, the explicit
distinction between term and at will employees would result in limited application of
such status.
Kouff's termination would have been deemed lawful under either of these analyses. In
the aftermath of the court of appeal's curious and contrary approach, they have been
neglected. However, they remain reasonable alternatives for resolving the question of
how far the protections of an ambiguous unlawful discharge statute should extend.
Meanwhile, the ambiguity first addressed in Kouff remains, since neither section 2922
nor the California employee protection statutes have ever clarified the term "employee,"
or otherwise specified who should be subject to, or protected from, discharge at will.
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ployer should bear the burden of developing a public policy argument to overcome the presumption of at will employee protection, at
the peril of losing whatever discharge rights section 2922 provided.
Thus, termination at will had been demoted from the status of a
statutory right, to a mere policy which if not justified would be summarily disallowed in the face of any employee protection statute.
Subjected to such a public policy balancing test, section 2922 was a

marginal and unreliable source of protection for at will termination.
Ten years later, another California appellate court significantly

extended the Kouff approach. In Petermann v. InternationalBroth-

erhood of Teamsters27 the court applied Kouffs public policy emphasis in an at will termination involving much less specific public

policy directives. Petermann alleged that he had been fired in retalia-

tion for disobeying his union's orders to commit perjury before a

state legislative committee.2 No statute specifically prohibited the
union from discharging an employee for appearing before such a fo-

rum, or for failing to comply with its directive.

9

In the absence of

such a law, the union contended that Petermann could be discharged

without inquiry or justification as to cause.30
The court disagreed, holding that there prevailed a public policy
against perjury superior to whatever public policy at will termination
27. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). The trial court applied section
2922 in routine fashion, sustaining the union's demurrer on the basis of its right to discharge Petermann for any reason.
28. Petermann was subpoenaed to testify before the Assembly Interim Committee
on Governmental Efficiency and Economy of the California Legislature, and alleged that
he was ordered by a union official to make false statements in his testimony before the
committee. He refused, and was discharged the day after testifying. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d
at 26.
29. In fact, a 1937 California statute does come close to providing a specific statutory prohibition against Petermann's perjury. Section 2856 of the Labor Code provides
that "[an employee shall substantially comply with all the directions of his employer
concerning the service on which he is engaged, except where such obedience is impossible or unlawful, or would impose new and unreasonable burdens upon the employee."
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2856 (West 1975) (emphasis added).
This provision does not make it illegal to discharge an employee for refusing to perform unlawful activities (such as perjury), but it does suggest that an employee could
refuse to perform them and still remain faithful to his contractual duties to his employer.
The court, while noting section 2856, did not rely upon it in its public policy analysis.
See infra note 41; see also Crossen v. Foremost McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076
(N.D. Cal. 1982) (federal court cited CAL. LAB. CODE § 2856 to support public policy
prohibition against employee discharge).
30. The court of appeal noted that Petermann was subject to an employment contract "which does not contain any fixed period of duration. Generally, such a relationship
is terminable at the will of either party for any reason whatsoever .... " Petermann,
174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted).

and section 2922 embodied. 31 The court recognized the difficulty of
defining public policy, and the problems in translating it into a recognizable rule for employers to follow in discharging at will employees.3 2 Nevertheless, it found that the public policy against perjury 33
and the solicitation of perjury34 clearly prohibited the particular dis35
charge in this case.
In the tradition of Kouff, the court had extended protection to an

at will employee previously recognized as having none. But

Petermann went much further, extending protection where no em-

ployee had previously been recognized as having any, based upon an
implied, rather than an explicit, prohibition against discharge.
As Kouff and Petermann framed the issue, an employee's discharge was always a question of social policy, subject to a balancing
of competing social interests. Section 2922 was endlessly qualified,
subject to restriction or outright exception whenever disallowing an
at will employee's termination served a superior policy. The cases
adopting the Petermannrationale revealed just how inferior the right
to terminate was when pitted against competing policy derived from
the statutes.35

31. The court announced its reliance on public policy casually and without authority, simply stating that "the right to discharge an employee under such a [terminable
at will] contract may be limited by statute or by considerationsof public policy." Id.
(citing CAL. ELEC. CODE § 695 and Kouff) (emphasis added).
32. Attempting to find a suitable definition, the court first explained that "[b]y
'public policy' is intended that principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good
.
." Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting Safeway Stores v.
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953)) (emphasis in
original).
The court later set forth an even more general definition of public policy as
"[w]hatever contravenes good morals or any established interests of society ...
"
Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 118 (West Supp. 1986).
34. Id. § 653f.
35. See Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy
and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether
the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground
that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by
statute.
Ird. (emphasis added).
36. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Still, standing alone these exceptions to section 2922 and the at will rule encroach only marginally on an employer's right
to dismiss at will employees. As the most inferior of statutory mandates, section 2922
still emerges - qualified, but valid - in situations in which there is no competing
statute.
In fact, at least one case suggests that section 2922 is not presumptively inferior to all
such statutes. In Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960), a
court of appeal upheld a trial court finding that an employer did not act unlawfully in
discharging an at will employee for notifying the local court that she was willing to serve
as a trial juror. The court deferred to the legislature as the proper forum to consider and
decide the permissibility of such discharges as a matter of public policy.
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-Although suggesting a fairly coherent, limited methodology for
qualifying the absolute freedom to discharge at will, the Petermann

and Kouff tandem provided unpredictable results. The state's statutes explicitly and implicitly defined certain unjust or immoral
causes - causes that courts would refuse to allow as the reason for
an employee's termination, even when the employee was otherwise
terminable at will. In 1980 the California Supreme Court destroyed
whatever fragile balance between employee discharge and protection
policy inquiry well past
this approach offered, expanding the public
37
linchpin.
statutory
Petermann's
and
Kouff
Expansion of the Public Policy Doctrine: The Covenant of Good
Faith

Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co."8 is the California Supreme
Court's most significant decision in the law of termination at will.
The court rejected the more restrained approach of the courts of appeal in Kouff and Petermann.Rather, it based its decision on considThe court's restraint, and its treatment of unlawful discharge as an essentially legislative question, contrast dramatically with the Petermann court's more ambitious attempt
to define public policy. Responding to plaintiff's argument that the employer's termination was unlawful and therefore should be recognized as a breach of contract, the court
in Mallard stated:
Although we may feel that this would be good public policy, to so hold would
establish a rule which would apply in all instances where persons are discharged from their employment because they have made themselves available
for jury service, regardless of the circumstances. If public policy requires that
the protection should be afforded prospective jurors, we feel it should be done
by the Legislature as they have done in the case of election officials.
Id. at 396, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 175. The legislature responded to the court's invitation in
1968, enacting a statute which overruled the decision. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Becket v. Welton Becket & Assocs., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 531 (1974) (no wrongful discharge cause of action for employee of a corporation,
fired after bringing suit for corporate mismanagement against employer on behalf of an
estate for which employee was co-executor).
37. The Petermannpublic policy analysis became a model for other states seeking
a formula for limiting at will termination where no statute expressly prohibited the discharge. Statutes adopting its approach in looking for public policy implied by statute
include: Michigan (Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d
385 (1978)); Connecticut (Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d
385 (1980)); Illinois (Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981)); Oregon (Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975)); and West
Virginia (Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978)). The last
two of these decisions played an important part in the California Supreme Court's further expansion of the Petermann rule in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). See infra note 43 and accompanying
text.
38. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).

erations of public policy, while refusing to rely upon or be bound by

the statute books in determining policy mandates. Further, the court
recognized wrongful discharge as sounding in tort as well as con-

tract, while Petermann considered only contract liability. Most sig-

nificantly, it deemed employment contracts subject to an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the violation of which constituted an independent ground for liability.
Tameny alleged that he had been fired for refusing to participate
in his employer's price-fixing scheme.3 9 He sought damages under
several theories of liability including an action for wrongful discharge premised upon the Petermann public policy exception to permissible at will termination.40 The court not only agreed, 41 but upheld Tameny's further contention that tort, as well as contract,
damages should be awarded in the wake of a discharge inimical to
39. Id. at 167, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840. Tameny, as a sales
representative for Areo, was pressured to participate in Arco's conspiracy to fix the retail
price of gasoline at Arco service stations. He alleged that he was fired for refusing to
"threaten and cajole" service station dealers to cooperate in the price-fixing scheme. Id.
40. 27 Cal. 3d at 171, 610 P.2d at 1332, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 841. Tameny sought
damages from Arc under several theories, based upon his contention that he was fired
for refusing to break the law by participating in an antitrust scheme specifically prohibited by statute in the Cartwright Antitrust Act, CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE §§ 1670016758 (West 1969). His complaint included a treble damage action under the Cartwright Act; a breach of contract claim premised upon an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; a tort action alleging interference by Arco with his contractual relations; and a claim of "wrongful discharge" not nominated as lying in tort or contract but
based upon the holding in Petermann.
The trial court upheld Arco's demurrer on all counts except the implied covenant
breach of contract claim. Tameny dismissed the contract claim in order to preserve the
case in its entirety on appeal. Id. The supreme court addressed Tameny's claims for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, interference with contractual relations, and
wrongful discharge.
41. The court quoted Petermann at length, emphasizing the similarities between
the two cases and noting that Petermann "imposes a significant condition on the employer's broad power of dismissal by nullifying the right to discharge because an employee refuses to perform an unlawful act." Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 173, 610 P.2d at
1333, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The court summarized Petermannas establishing the rule
that:
[e]ven in the absence of an explicit statutory provision prohibiting the discharge of a worker. . . fundamentalprinciples of public policy and adherence
to the objectives underlying the state's penal statutes require the recognition of
a rule barring an employer from discharging an employee who has simply complied with his legal duty and has refused to commit an illegal act.
Id. at 174, 610 P.2d at 1333-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43 (emphasis added).
The supreme court questioned the failure of the court of appeal in Petermann to buttress its decision with CAL. LAB. CODE § 2856 (West 1975). See supra note 29 and
accompanying text. The high court stressed that section's declaration that "[a]n employee shall substantially comply with all the directions of his employer concerning the
service on which he is engaged, except where such obedience is impossible or unlawful
.... " 27 Cal. 3d at 174 n.8, 610 P.2d at 1334 n.8, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843 n.8. (emphasis
in original). The court recognized the statute as reflecting "direct legislative approval of
the basic proposition that an employer enjoys no authority to direct an employee to engage in unlawful conduct." Id.
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public policy. 42 Citing Kouff, several California insurance cases, and
a select group of out-of-state opinions, the court ruled that the public

policy balancing formula in Petermann should apply to much less

defined policy interests than those the Petermann court had relied

upon. 43 The court thus distilled the single most volatile element from
the Petermann wrongful discharge formula -

its holding that public

policy controlled in determining whether an employee discharge was
permissible or wrongful. It dispensed with the statutory constraints

the court of appeal had carefully recognized in defining public policy, minimal as those constraints may have been, and added tort liability to the resulting formulation.
Lastly, the court in a now-famous footnote observed that Arco had
violated a "covenant of good faith and fair dealing" which, it announced, independently applied to this and all employment agreements. 44 It did not discuss Arco's liability under this theory. Never42. The trial court had found that Tameny's pleadings plainly asserted a cause
for breach of contract, but sustained Arco's demurrer to the extent that it sounded in
tort. 27 Cal. 3d at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840. Petermann certainly
supported this holding, since the claim there had sounded in contract alone and recognized damages based upon the union's breach of an implied contractual duty not to fire
someone for testifying before a legislative committee. Nevertheless, the supreme court
concluded that "the relevant authorities both in California and throughout the country
establish that when an employer's discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover
damages traditionally available in such actions." Id. at 170, 610 P.2d at 1331, 164 Cal.
Rptr. at 640.
43. The court relied heavily on two out-of-state opinions that had recently cited
Petermann: Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), and Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978). Though both cases recognized public
policy as qualifying the right to discharge, neither state court adopted Petermann's critical thesis that the place to find public policy lay in the state statutes.
Thus in Nees, the Oregon Supreme Court found that discharging an employee for
performing jury duty was a "socially undesirable motive [for which] the employer must
respond in damages," Nees, 272 Or. at 218, 536 P.2d at 515, without basing its finding
of "social undesirability" in any statute. In Harless, a bank employee was discharged for
disclosing to auditors certain illegal overcharges collected by his employer. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, deeming it unnecessary to cite any statutory basis
for its analysis, declared that any termination is unlawful if it "contravene[d] some substantial public policy principle . . . ." Harless, 162 W. Va. at 124, 246 S.E.2d at 275.
Nowhere did the West Virginia court suggest how or where to find these principles.
The Tameny decision therefore essentially rested upon two cases, drawn from out-ofstate jurisdictions, in which employee plaintiffs had prevailed in wrongful discharge litigation based upon a showing far less specific than what had been required in California.
Nees and Harless, the court nevertheless contended, were "merely illustrative of a rapidly growing number of cases throughout the country that in recent years have recognized a common law tort action for wrongful discharge in which the termination contravenes public policy." Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
845.
44. Conceding that consideration of the question was unnecessary, the court pro-

theless, its recognition of the covenant underscored the court's
expansive thesis that public policy, recognized in even as undefined a
tenet as "good faith and fair dealing," would govern the propriety of
employee dismissal in California. No longer would lower courts need
refer to the statutes. Moreover, the full measure of both tort and
contract recovery were made available to the wrongfully discharged
employee.
The breadth of the Tameny opinion - its intentional departure
from the Petermann prerequisite that public policy have a statutory
grounding, and the implications arising out of its implied covenant
discussibn - virtually ensured its inconsistent application. Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.45 and Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,4' two
court of appeal opinions issued soon after Tameny, appropriately
highlighted Tameny's doctrinal vagueness and the implications for
lower courts addressing wrongful discharge claims.
Cleary represented the first attempt by an appellate court to apply
the Tameny doctrine, an attempt with disturbing results. Cleary, discharged after eighteen years of continuous employment with American, alleged his termination was in retaliation for his union activities.
His complaint sounded in both tort and contract, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages.' 7
The court's opinion was a six-part, wandering foray into the California case law and statutes that ultimately applied Tameny in finding American liable in both tort and contract for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court failed to
acknowledge Cleary's argument of retaliatory anti-union discharge
a theory strongly supported by case precedent pointing to American's liability.48 The court ignored Cleary's retaliatory discharge
ceeded to consider it anyway in announcing that "authorities in other jurisdictions have
on occasion found an employer's discharge of an at-will employee violative of the employer's 'good faith and fair dealing' obligations. . . and past California cases have held
that a breach of this implied-at-law covenant sounds in tort as well as in contract." Id. at
179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12. The court cited a line of
insurance cases which, as with the line of cases supporting its declaration of tort liability,
were clearly distinguishable from the facts of Tameny and involved a special fiduciary
contract relationship. It also cited a group of less than compelling out-of-state cases to
support its argument. See infra notes 50 & 75 and accompanying text.
45. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
46. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
47. The court of appeal considered the trial court's decision on Cleary's fifth
amended complaint - amendments at least in part attributable to the issuance of the
Tameny decision. One of Cleary's causes alleged the breach of an oral contract - what
the court of appeals labelled as his "wrongful discharge" action. In addition, he sought
liability under the tort theories of wrongful interference with a business relationship, and
wrongful inducement of breach of contract. The trial court sustained American's demurrers on all counts, and dismissed. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 446, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
723-24.
48. American alleged facts to support Cleary's discharge for cause, claiming his
involvement in alleged thefts and his poor work record. It further contended that Cleary
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claim, which easily satisfied the Petermann test for wrongful discharge,"9 and according to Tameny justified the award of tort as well
as contract damages.

Rather, the court found liability based solely on American's violation of the "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the
right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.". 0 What
the supreme court had earlier noted in dicta, 51 the Cleary court of
appeal now elevated to the level of doctrine, and substituted for the
true holding in Tameny.
Equally disturbing was the court's selective reliance on two factors
in the history of the relationship between the parties - factors that
was an at will employee, terminable without regard to cause. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr.
at 724.
The case is therefore distinguishable from many of the previous at will termination
cases in that the employer raised a defense of just cause on the facts, as well as asserting
its authority to dismiss the employee at will and without cause. In fact, the notion of
"terminable at will" had already become a misnomer, since specific statutory prohibitions
and the Petermann public policy exceptions had created a significant number of causes
for which a terminable at will employee could not be terminated.
The court of appeal noted the case of Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal.
App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961), but failed to cite it as controlling despite its
holding that an employer could not discharge an at will employee for participating in
union activities. Cleary, 11 Cal. App. 3d at 450, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 726. See supra note
19.
49. The Petermann analysis required that the court of appeal determine the lawfulness of Cleary's discharge by balancing his right to participate in union activities, as
set forth in CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101-1102 (West Supp. 1986), against American's right
and interest in terminating him without cause. That analysis clearly supported a finding
of wrongful discharge, without need for further reference to or reliance upon the Glenn
decision.
50. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (quoting Comunale v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198 (1958)) (emphasis added by
the court). The court of appeal adopted Tameny's approach, in reasoning that the good
faith and fair dealing covenant derived from the special fiduciary nature of the insurance
contract. However, the court interpreted Comunale itself as extending the good faith
covenant to all contractual agreements, and not simply to insurance contracts.
Even accepting this curious reading of Comunale, the court's argument suggests that
these duties should derive from the contract itself, rather than from notions of public
policy expressed or implied by statute. Such implicitly contractual duties, if breached,
would give rise to a breach of contract rather than a tort cause of action.
The court of appeal never clarified those implications. Instead, it declared the duty to
deal fairly and in good faith as "unconditional and independent in nature" and cited
Tameny in concluding that "an employee's action for wrongful discharge is founded in
tort as well as in contract, and . . . the employer may be subject to liability for both
compensatory and punitive damages." Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453-54, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 728.
51. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
846 n.12.

it found simultaneously indicated American's understanding of the
good faith covenant, and that proved its breach in discharging
Cleary. The first of these two factors was Cleary's eighteen years of
service prior to his discharge, which the court characterized as of
"paramount importance."52 The second, which the court deemed of
considerable significance, involved American's use of written guidelines governing employee discipline, including procedures available
for employees to dispute company-imposed sanctions.5 3
Cleary left a wake in which it was virtually impossible to predict
whether an at will or term employee's discharge was wrongful. The
court avoided any weighing of the policies for and against discharge;
whether the employer had acted in good faith and fairly was the
single determinative liability issue. Cleary's application of the
Tameny doctrine made permissible termination at will difficult to
identify, and impossible to rely upon. It suggested that only shortterm employment devoid of internal guidelines, manuals or policies
for discharge could safely be terminated without good cause.
The following year another court of appeal handed down Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc.,54 a more faithful and sophisticated attempt to
apply Tameny. It contradicted Cleary outright, and illustrated the
problems inherent in the broad-brushed public policy analysis that
lower courts were invited to apply in Tameny's wake.
Pugh was discharged without explanation in 1973, after a successful thirty-two year career at See's throughout which he had received
positive evaluations, and continuous promotion. 5 Pugh produced evidence that his dismissal resulted from his opposition to an unfair pay
scale arrangement See's management had proposed to its employee
labor union."" See's defended solely on the ground that Pugh's at will
52.
that:

Id.

Cleary, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court reasoned

[t]ermination of employment without legal cause after such a period of time
offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in
all contracts, including employment contracts. As a result of this covenant, a
duty arose on the part of the employer. . . to do nothing which would deprive
. . . the employee, of the benefits of [that] employment [alone] ....

53. The court saw such internal policies as evidence of American's conscious adherence to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and proof that it had waived any
contractual right it might otherwise have been able to maintain to discharge Cleary at
will. It reasoned that the presence of such internal regulations "[compels] the conclusion
[American] had recognized its responsibility to engage in good faith and fair dealing
rather than in arbitrary conduct . . . ." Id.
54. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
55. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 316-17, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19. At the time of
his dismissal Pugh directed one of See's subsidiary companies. The year before his dismissal, he had been given the customary gold watch by See's management "in appreciation of 31 years of loyal service." Id.
56. Id. at 318-19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920. Pugh implicated both management and
the See's employee union, alleging that his discharge resulted from his objections to a
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status made him terminable without cause.5"
The court carefully inquired into, and specifically rejected, Pugh's
three statute-based claims of wrongful discharge, 58 which virtually
recited the Cleary declarations of what constituted wrongful discharge. Rather, the court examined the history of the relationship
between the parties. On that basis alone, the court concluded that
"in traditional contract terms . . . the employer's conduct gave rise
to an implied promise that it would not act arbitrarily in dealing
with its employees." 5 9 Finding that Pugh had alleged sufficient facts
to prove such "arbitrariness" by See's, the court reversed the trial
court's dismissal, and remanded for trial on the merits. 0
Pugh thus represented an extraordinary departure from the liberalizing trend that Petermann had introduced, and subsequent cases
had continued to expand upon. 61 Pugh, in diametric opposition to the
"sweetheart contract" between See's and the union. The court noted an excerpt from the
trial transcript, in which Pugh's successor allegedly told union officials, "Now we've
taken care of Mr. Pugh. What are you going to do for us." Id. See infra note 58.
57. See's made no attempt to justify Pugh's discharge, unlike American in the
Cleary case. See supra note 48. Moreover, Se's maintained no internal guidelines or
policies for employee discipline.
58. Pugh alleged discharge in retaliation for his refusal to support management
policies that violated restraint of trade and sexual discrimination laws. In addition, he
claimed a statutory duty to oppose these policies pursuant to his fiduciary duties of inquiry as a corporate officer. The court of appeal carefully considered each of the three
theories, all recognized as legitimate under the Tameny decision, but concluded that "appellant [Pugh] did not establish a prima facie and cognizable case of wrongful termination based upon the public policy theories he advanced." Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324,
171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
The court recognized Pugh's restraint of trade argument as falling squarely within the
precedent and principle of Tameny, which it noted provided "doctrinal support." However, the court found that the negotiations in which Pugh had participated did not constitute antitrust violations, and thus could not constitute illegal activity. Pugh, 116 Cal.
App. 3d at 323, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
Pugh's second theory argued that the wage agreement he had opposed discriminated
against women in violation of the Fair Employment Practices Act (now Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12900-12996). The court recognized the

legitimacy of the theory, but once again held that Pugh had failed to establish facts to
support it. It could not find a sufficient showing that Pugh had been discharged as a
direct result of his objection to the wage agreement on discriminating grounds. Id.
Pugh's final argument was that he was required, as a corporate officer, to make the
very inquiries for which he allegedly was discharged. The court held that Pugh had failed
to show he had acted in the capacity of an "inquiring corporate director," as that term
was used in the Corporations Code. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977), cited in
Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 923-24.
59. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
60. Id. at 331, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927-28.
61. However, it is noteworthy that the Pugh court's analysis would have yielded
liability in both the Petermann and Tameny cases. Petermann successfully alleged that
his discharge was specifically related to his refusal to perform a clearly illegal act of

Cleary case, was one court's attempt to confine the public policy ex-

ception to at will dismissal.
All the more remarkable, then, was its citation to Cleary in finding See's liable under the other of the two "limiting principles"
which it recognized as disallowing termination at will, that is, "when
the discharge is contrary to the terms of the statute, express or implied."' 62 Ignoring Cleary's use of the covenant of good faith,63 the
Pugh court chose rather to recognize the "totality of the parties' relationship" as creating an implied contract promise that Pugh would
not be terminated without good cause. The court looked to "the duration of the appellant's [Pugh's] employment, the commendations
and promotions he received, the apparent lack of any direct criticism
of his work, the assurances he was given, and the employer's acknowledged policies" as clear evidence of See's implied promise not

to discharge Pugh arbitrarily.6 '
Pugh was a remarkably restrained application of Tameny. It carefully avoided expansive public policy declarations, and clearly rejected Cleary's odd variation on that theme. The case recognized a
much more familiar covenant, that is, an implied promise not to discharge arbitrarily, which it conventionally derived from the conduct
and reasonable understandings of the parties to the contract. 5 Good
perjury. Likewise, Tameny could show that his termination was a direct response to his
refusal to price-fix. However, neither of those opinions was as restrictive or specific as the
court's standard in Pugh for establishing the facts necessary to support a public policy
exception to the at will rule.
62. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 322, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
63. The court noted:
If '[tiermination of employment without legal cause [after 18 years of service]
offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in
all contracts, including employment contracts,' as the court said in the abovequoted portion of Cleary, then afortiori that covenant would provide protection to Pugh, whose employment is nearly twice that duration. Indeed, it seems
difficult to defend termination of such a long-time employee arbitrarily, i.e.,
without some legitimate reason, as compatible with either good faith or fair
dealing.
We need not go that far, however.
Id. at 328, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (emphasis added).
In a following footnote, the court further noted "[n]or do we consider the implications
of the good faith and fair dealing requirement with respect to an employer's obligation, if
any, to provide procedural safeguards such as warning of intended discipline or opportunity for response to charges of misconduct." Id. at 329 n.25, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 n.25.
64. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The court noted that the plaintiff would
have the burden of proof on this issue.
65. Alternatively, the case may illustrate the quasi-contractual notion that unwritten, inexplicit representations or conduct by an employer can create a reasonable
implication, which the employee may infer and rely upon, that what once might have
been temporary or "at will" employment has become a permanent employment which
may only be ended for just cause.
Even this comparatively narrow analysis suggests a radical potential for modifying
contracts. Theoretically, agreements explicitly terminable at will at their onset would be
vulnerable to transformation by the "totality of subsequent circumstances" - perhaps

[VOL 24: 137, 1987]

Wrongful Discharge Alternative
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

faith was a minor element in the court's analysis, serving merely as
an initial assumption to make in determining what an employee
should presume in the face of long, continuous, satisfactory service
to an employer.66
More important than the decisional specifics of the two cases,
however, was the fact that they could emerge from the same supreme court opinion. Tameny provided no formula or definition for
discerning between the permissible and wrongful discharge. All
Tameny really announced was the judicial authority to strike down a
termination in the name of public policy. Cleary and Pugh represented one expansive and one restrictive attempt to give substance to
that declaration. Neither decision, however, provided much insight
or guidance in prospectively determining whether a particular employment relationship was terminable at will, or subject to a good
cause discharge requirement.
The Trend After Pugh
Cases since the Pugh and Cleary decisions reveal erratic trends in
the courts. There is a tendency to adopt the more constrained analysis of Pugh, rather than the Cleary implied covenant theory of liability. The trend, while noteworthy, only confirms the lack of authoritative guidance in the wrongful discharge area. It is still impossible to
recognize or predict whether an employee discharge is wrongful; judicial response to litigation in the area continues to obscure, more
than it does clarify, the bounds of permissible discharge.
Shapiro v. Wells FargoRealty Advisors67 is perhaps the most significant post-Pugh wrongful discharge decision for three reasons: 1)
the court of appeal's carefully narrow summary of wrongful discharge law; 2) the court's refusal to recognize tort liability in at will
termination; and 3) the strictness with which it analyzed the wrongful discharge pleadings in the case.
In Shapiro, the court considered a three-pronged wrongful disconsisting of nothing more than employer friendliness, encouragement or approval into something more permanent than either the employer or employee ever understood or
intended it to be.
66. The deemphasis on good faith in Pugh also removed the component of tort
liability that Cleary had reintroduced into wrongful discharge. Once again, the court of
appeal did not so much take issue with Cleary as ignore it. The court's failure to recognize a tort cause in Pugh removed punitive damages from the case, however, and in so
doing clearly lowered the liability ceiling that Tameny and Cleary had raised.
67. 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).

charge action6 8 brought by the vice-president of a realty company,
discharged pursuant to the terms of a written agreement 9 which
specified his terminability at will. Shapiro's three and one-half year
term of employment before discharge was relatively short compared
to the employment histories of employees Cleary and Pugh.70
However, Shapiro sought to prove other circumstances tending to
show that the terminability issue had been modified, including company approval of his work, intimations of the permanence of his position, and the unfair, summary nature of his discharge without a forum for inquiry or response. 71 His case was therefore framed both
within the "totality of circumstances" test of Pugh, and within the
alleged deceptive conduct and false representations concerning job

security deemed critical by both the Cleary and Pugh courts.
Nevertheless, the court of appeal allowed the demurrer on all
counts, holding that Shapiro had not set forth facts sufficient to overcome the termination at will clause in his employment contract. The
court's cautionary perspective in considering wrongful discharge was
apparent from the outset. It undertook an historical analysis of the
case law and selectively quoted Tameny:
In a series of cases arising out of a variety of factual settings in which
discharge clearly violated an expressed statutory objective or undermined
a firmly establishedprinciple of public policy, courts have recognized that
an employer's traditionally broad authority to discharge an at-will employee
'may be limited by statute ... or by considerations of public policy.'12
68. Id. at 473, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 615. Shapiro held the position of executive
president with Wells Fargo. He alleged termination without cause in breach of anviceimplied-in-fact contract term that he would not be terminated without good cause; that his
discharge was wrongful and malicious, giving rise to punitive damage liability in tort;
and that Wells Fargo had independently breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, once again giving rise to punitive damages for willful concealment of fraudulent representations, and intentional denial of the opportunity to obtain the maximum
benefits of his employment. Id.
69. A provision in the written "Stock Option Agreement" between the parties
expressly reserved Wells Fargo's right to "discharge [Shapiro] at any time for any reason
whatsoever, with or without good cause." The agreement expressly stated that it did not
grant Shapiro "any right to continue in his employment." Id. at 474-75, 199 Cal. Rptr.
at 616.
70. Id. at 473, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
71. See supra note 68.
72. Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 475, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (citing Tameny, 27
Cal. 3d at 172, 610 P.2d at 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 839) (emphasis added). Essentially,
this is the Petermann standard revived. Its use as an introduction and premise for the
court's opinion reinstituted a theme that had lost favor with the courts after Tameny that is, that the statutory basis for public policy remained a threshhold question for parties arguing public policy, and that the employer's authority to discharge an at will employee remained an underlying right, subject to exception but not to outright denial.
The court characterized Tameny as representing but one of "three distinct theories" of
wrongful discharge limiting the application of section 2922, the other two being separately articulated by the Cleary and Pugh courts. It then proceeded to deny liability
under each of them. It summarized the different approaches as follows: (1)"a tort cause
of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy" (Tameny); (2) "a cause of
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The court peremptorily dismissed Shapiro's public policy claims, as
he could cite no public policy to support his claim other than that

California should promote job security and stability in the
community."s

The court's treatment of Shapiro's Cleary-based claim was simi-

larly brief, albeit a bit more subtle. Rather than attempt to summa-

rize the case in a single sentence, as it had with Tameny, the court
looked to the factors announced in Cleary -__7

that is, the longevity

action for employer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
which sounds both in tort and contract" (Cleary); and (3) "a cause of action for employer's breach of an implied-in-fact covenant to terminate only for good cause" (Pugh).
Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 475-76, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
This is an attractive, coherent recapitulation of the history of the cases, which the
court of appeals seemed to derive in part from the three-part structure of Shapiro's complaint, and in part from scholarship in the wrongful discharge area. It is also an oversimplification of the cases that goes beyond both the scope and factual contexts of Cleary
and Pugh to create defined segregable theories where the courts there properly failed to
see any.
It is noteworthy that the court's analysis closely resembles that of an earlier, uncited
court of appeal decision in the case of Crosier v. United Postal Serv., 150 Cal. App. 3d
1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983). See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. Both
courts evidently were adopting certain aspects of the "trilogy" thesis by Professors Miller
and Estes in their 1982 law review article on the subject. See Miller & Estes, Recent
JudicialLimitations on the Right to Discharge:A California Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 65 (1982), cited in Crosier, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 1138 n.7, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 364
n.7; Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 476 n.4, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 617 n.4. The simplicity of
the thesis that Tameny, Cleary and Pugh create distinct and segregable causes of action,
while subject to debate, has thus found its way into the case law and methodology of
wrongful discharge.
73. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 477, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 618. The court stated that Shapiro's discharge involved no "substantial policy principle," citing and emphasizing the
language of Tameny. Id. It further cited Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 171 (1960), in support of the proposition that "courts have no power to declare
public policy in wrongful discharge cases without statutory support." See supra note 36
and accompanying text.
The citation to Mallardis remarkable for several reasons. First, the court reverted to a
pre-Tameny decision, when almost all recent wrongful discharge cases had looked to
Tameny and the court of appeal cases refashioning it. Mallard based its liability analysis
on the Petermann requirement that a discharge violate statutorily defined public policy;
Tameny had expanded the realm of public policy beyond the statute books, and the
courts of appeal had followed suit.
Finally, Mallard had long stood as the exception, rather than the rule, in applying the
Petermann formula. In most of the cases courts easily found sufficient public policy to
overturn an at will discharge. The Mallardcourt did not. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Shapiro thus represents a purposeful retreat from the Tameny thesis, and a revitalized, stricter application of the Petermann formula. The Shapiro court's subsequent rejection of the even more expansive Cleary covenant theory was thus predictable.
74. Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 619. On their facts,
Shapiro and Cleary were obviously distinguishable: Shapiro's length of employment
failed to match Cleary's 32 years of service. Moreover, there was no dispute procedure

of the plaintiff's service, together with the expressed policy of the
employer in providing specific procedures for resolving employee disputes. The court noted Shapiro's relatively short work history, and
the lack of any suggestion that he, like plaintiff Cleary, had been
denied access to company dispute procedures, and held that Shapiro
had failed to allege facts sufficient to justify his claim under the
5
Cleary liability formula.7
Shapiro's remaining claim was considered in the context of Pugh.
The court accepted Shapiro's contention that factors other than job
longevity could result in the modification of an otherwise permissible
at will discharge. However, it then took particular note of the express at will term in the written contract between Shapiro and Wells

Fargo, warning, "[t]here cannot be a valid express contract and an
implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring
different results.17 6 With the written terms of agreement so emphasized, and Pugh so narrowly interpreted and strictly applied, the
court's dismissal of Shapiro's breach of contract claim was almost
perfunctory. In short, it concluded, as a matter of law, that Shapiro
"was unable to rebut the presumption of his 'at-will' status."' 7
The approach in Shapiro is somewhat curious, but its conservatism is clear. The court of appeal refused Cleary's invitation to appropriate good faith and fair dealing, as an independent basis for
employer liability, into the employment contract relationship.78 It acdenied to Shapiro, in contrast to the allegation in Cleary that American Airlines had
failed to grant Cleary his full dispute rights. Finally, there was no contract in Cleary
explicitly defining the employee as terminable at will.
75. In upholding the demurrer on the implied covenant count, the court deflated
much of the Cleary good faith balloon. It questioned Cleary's implied covenant analysis
outright, noting that although Cleary recognized "an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in every contract, the law with regard to the tort of bad faith breach of
contract is well developed only in the insurance field." Id. (citation omitted). It thus
undercut Cleary's fundamental contention that a fiduciary relationship analogous to the
insurance agreement exists between all employers and employees, a relationship which
superimposes upon their contractual relationship a duty of good faith that termination
without cause inherently violates. This main thesis gone, Cleary is of no doctrinal value
to an employee in Shapiro's situation.
The court of appeal also rejected the aigument that breach of the implied covenant
gave rise to an action in tort. Once again it simply rejected the insurance analogy upon
which Cleary relied. It also distinguished Shapiro's pleadings from the principle noninsurance case applying the tort of bad faith breach. Id. at 478-79, 199 Cal. Rtpr. at 619
(citing Sawyer v. Bank of America, 83 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1968));
See Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract:When If At All, Should It Be
Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions,64 MARQ. L. REv. 425 (1981), cited in Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 479 n.7, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 419 n.7.
76. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 621-22 (citing Wal-Noon Corp. v.
Hill, 45 Cal. App. 3d 605, 119 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1975)). See Crain v. Burroughs Corp.,
560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983). See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
77. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 482, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
78. While Pugh and most of the subsequent cases avoid the Cleary approach, no
court before Shapiro had been so outright in recanting its teachings.
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knowledged Pugh, but restricted its application and stressed the
written agreement as determinative in the totality of the circum-

stances.7 9 Finally, it represents litigation subjected to an exacting

standard of pleading that will inevitably deny access to some merito-

rious employment cases.

The trends that Shapiro suggests appear in several other recent at

will decisions. In 1983, a federal district court in California applied

state law to uphold an explicit at will termination provision in an

employment agreement, even where there were implications that the
employer had represented otherwise to the employee. That case,
Crain v. Burroughs,0 applied Pugh in weighing the terms of a writ-

ten employment agreement against an alleged oral promise of discharge for cause only. In finding for employer, Burroughs, the court
did not recognize any overriding covenant of good faith sufficient to
disallow termination at will.81 The case confirms the vitality of at
will dismissal, at least where the at will term is clearly agreed to and
understood by the parties to the contract.
Crosier v. United Parcel Service8 2 may be an even more significant holding. The court of appeal in Crosier upheld summary judg-

ment for UPS, in a case in which the discharged employee alleged
procedural unfairness and management unreasonableness constituting a breach of the implied covenant of good faith.83 The court re79. Such attention to the written document subverts Pugh, suggesting that a written contract term providing for termination at will has presumptive superiority over contrary conduct or implications. The Pugh court, stressing as it did the totality of circumstances involved, would probably have been less impressed than the Shapiro court with a
written at will termination clause. Shapiro and Crain together tend to limit Pugh and its
"totality of circumstances" test to cases in which no written contract term specifies discharge rights. They thus suggest a method by which employers may erect a barrier to
court consideration of the reasons for an employee's discharge.
80. 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
81. See id. The court held that "Plaintiff [Crain] cannot avail herself of such
California Court of Appeal cases [as Cleary and Pugh] because the extremely narrow
circumstances under which those cases were decided are not present in Plaintiff's case."
Id. at 853. The totality of circumstances cited by employee Crain was far less persuasive
than that considered by the Pugh court; the court noted that "[a]t the time of [Crain's]
termination, she had less than two years of employment with Burroughs and a less than
satisfactory performance record . . . ." Id.
The court was also impressed by the express termination at will term in the written
agreement between the parties, noting, as had the court of appeal in Shapiro, that Crain
"may not rely on the terms of an implied contract ... to contradict the terms of the
written employment contract in effect at the time of her termination." Id. at 852 (citation to Crossen omitted).
82. 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983).
83. Id. at 1134-35, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63. Crosier alleged a breach of a contract containing a covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of the implied covenant

fused to interpret the covenant as granting employees the right to
dispute or appeal employer sanctions, in a case seemingly full of equitable elements
supporting liability under Cleary's implied covenant
84
principles.

Crosier's essential claim was that UPS' dismissal rules were unreasonable, and that his dismissal therefore was arbitrary per se.s 5
The court, however, saw no implied contractual obligation that he be
discharged only for good cause, refuting the Pugh court's footnoted
proposition that a long-term, faithful employee might have a contractual right to some appeal forum for preventing employer arbitrariness.86 The court refused to dismiss the relevancy of an employer's motives altogether, stating that the "implied in fact or
implied in law promise to dismiss an employee only for cause would
be illusory if the employer were permitted to be the sole judge and
final arbiter of the propriety of the policy giving rise to the disindependent of the contract; and wrongful interference with business relations (a cause
abandoned before trial). UPS admitted the existence of the implied covenant for purposes of its motion for summary judgment, but alleged that as a matter of law it had not
breached the covenant because Crosier's termination was for just cause.
84. Crosier had been employed by UPS for 25 years, and therefore could point to
longevity in employment recognized as critical in both the Pugh and Cleary analyses. In
addition, he had performed his job well. He had been promoted to a managerial position,
and given routinely positive performance appraisals. Finally, neither the contract nor any
other circumstances of his employment bore the explicit or continuous declarations of
terminability that characterized the Shapiro and Crain cases. Crosier, 150 Cal. App. 3d
at 1134-35, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
The, court deemed Crosier to be an at will employee, and treated the case as one
"where an employer is allegedly in breach of an employment contract to retain an employee 'so long as his services are satisfactory.' " Id. at 1138, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 365. That
the court could proceed to its conclusions without further attention to Crosier's employment status only highlights how blurred the distinction between at will and term employees has become in California.
85. Crosier was discharged after disclosure of his affair with another employee, in
violation of a company nonfraternization policy. The court described the policy as an
.unwritten rule proscribing social relationships between management and nonmanagement employees. The purposes of the rule are to avoid misunderstandings, complaints of
favoritism and possible claims of sexual harassment." Id.,at 1135, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
The court was sympathetic to Crosier's unfairness claim, but just as sensitive to preserving the rights of UPS to terminate him absent demonstrably bad cause, or implied
contract terms varying the presumed at will relationship:
Crosier has a strong interest in the stability of his employment . . . . UPS,
however, is legitimately concerned with appearances of favoritism, possible
claims of sexual harassment and employee dissension . . . . UPS must be permitted ample latitude in disciplining its personnel. Crosier has not made a colorable claim that UPS failed to act in good faith toward him.
Id. at 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
86. The court found no merit in Crosier's theory that the "spirit of California
wrongful discharge decisions encourages such a rule." Id. at 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
It also distinguished Crosier's situation from both that of California civil service employees, and "individuals who are prevented from practicing a profession." Id. at 1140-41,
198 Cal. Rptr. at 367. "[A]lthough Crosier may have difficulty in reentering the job
market," it said, "he is not foreclosed from pursuing his trade or profession with another
employer." Id. at 1140-41, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
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charge."' 87 The decision thus theoretically preserved the cause of action. The court expressed a significant preference for the more restrictive Pugh formula for liability, proceeded to a good faith
analysis partaking more of Cleary than Pugh, and finally allowed for
summary judgment and dismissal more restrictive than either of
those cases or Tameny. 88
The trend recognizing three segregable causes of action for wrongful discharge in California continues to develop. 9 Recent cases seem
inclined to wander down one or more of the liability paths without
attention to their interrelationship or interdependence. At least one
decision using that approach has threatened to explode whatever delicate balance Shapiro imposed on wrongful discharge, in favor of a
wide open Cleary inquiry into good faith and public policy.
In Khanna v. Microdata Corp.,90 a court of appeal upheld a
wrongful discharge award to an employee fired for suing his company over the amount of a sales commission. The court based its
decision solely on the employer's violation of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, without reference to any of the limiting
principles of Tameny, Pugh, or Shapiro.91 It rejected Microdata's
argument that the Cleary implied covenant principles should be limited to the facts of that case, declaring:
87. Id. at 1140, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
88. The decision in Crosier clearly illustrates the quandary facing a court attempting to read the conflicting judicial signals in California's law of wrongful discharge.
The court of appeal attempted to reconcile Tameny, Cleary and Pugh by relying upon
scholarship in the area which it admitted only in small part interpreted the application of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 1137, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The court recognized Crosier's claims as being premised on the Tameny and Cleary good faith theories. It superimposed upon that
formula the Pugh burden of proof; and finally, treated the result as one for breach of
contract without the accompanying tort liability, which both Tameny and Cleary recognized. This partial and hybrid use of selected elements of the cases emphasizes how marginal is the guidance of precedent in the area.
89. See supra note 72.
90. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
91. The court stated that "[a]lthough elements of all three 'wrongful discharge'
theories are present here, we choose . . . to focus on the cause of action for the employer's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in
the contract." Id. at 260, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
Microdata conceded that Khanna was terminated solely for commencing and continuing a lawsuit in which he disputed the percentage of a computer sale due him as commission. After being discharged, Khanna dismissed the suit in order that Microdata make
good on his commission. When Microdata continued to refuse to pay him, Khanna again
brought suit alleging fraud, wrongful discharge, breach of the implied covenant, and
breach of the terms of the employment contract. The jury found on his behalf without
recognizing liability under a specific cause, and awarded him compensatory damages. Id.
at 258, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864.

We cannot agree. . . that the facts relied upon by the court in Cleary are
the sine qua non to establishing a breach of the covenant . . . .To the
contrary, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts is established whenever the employer engages in 'bad
faith action extraneous to the contract, combined with the 92obligor's intent
to frustrate the [employee's] enjoyment of contract rights.'

The court proceeded, rather ominously, to suggest that "the mere

fact that in past cases a violation of the implied covenant has been
predicated on a limited variety of factual grounds does not in and of

itself mean that those are the only grounds that will in the future
suffice."' 3 The court found sufficient evidence in the record to support a breach of the implied covenant of good faith based on a bad
faith retaliatory discharge.94
In yet another illustration of the inconsistency in the courts, in
Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court,9 5 another court of appeal

92. Id. at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (citing Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 478-79,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 619).
93. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The "limited variety
of factual grounds" to which the court referred, derived from the decision of a court of
appeal in Newfield v. Insurance Co. of the West, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1984). The Newfield court observed that applications of the covenant of good faith
"were always predicated upon other public policy grounds, statutory violations, or express (or clearly implied) contract grounds, or upon a combination of elements (e.g.,
especially longevity of service together with some added element . . .)." Id. at 445, 203
Cal. Rptr. at 12, cited in Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 263, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68
(emphasis in original).
The Khanna court dismissed this analysis as "gratuitous" since liability in Newfield
was independently held to have been barred by the statute of frauds. Khanna, 170 Cal.
App. 3d at 264, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
94. Compare Comerio v. Beatrice Foods Co., 600 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Mo. 1985)
in which a federal court applying California law in a diversity action took a much more
restrictive view of Cleary:
A literal application of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] . . . would
result in complete abolition of the employment-at-will doctrine. Although the
decisions applying Cleary are somewhat confused, it is clear that California
courts, including the Cleary court, have not abolished the employment-at-will
doctrine ....
What Cleary and its progeny did was create, in certain circumstances, an
implied promise that the employee will not be discharged except for good
cause. Pugh succinctly summarized the circumstances or factors that may give
rise to such a promise ....
Id. at 769 (citations to Crain, Shapiro, Newfield, Crosier,and Pugh omitted). The court,
applying the Cleary principles strictly in the context of the Pugh factors, granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment where the discharged employee had been employed for only three years, and could not provide evidence of personnel policies or other
assurances giving rise to a reasonable belief that he would not be discharged except for
good cause.
This attempt to reconcile Pugh and Cleary, rather than recognize them as developing
separate and independent theories for wrongful discharge, sets the federal district court's
opinion in Comerio apart from most of the recent decisions emerging out of the California courts. See supra note 72. However, it shares their skepticism in taking the Cleary
good faith doctrine literally, without some limitation upon or definition of good faith and
fair dealing.
95. 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 211 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1985). The court of appeal decision issued on a petition for a writ of mandamus brought by employer Tyco Industries,
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upheld a denial of liability under the public policy exception of
wrongful discharge. The Tyco court refused to recognize a public
policy exception to the at will rule based upon a statute forbidding
employers from misrepresenting terms of future employment.9 6 Noting first that Tyco had not violated the statute, 97 the court proceeded
to consider and reject the plaintiff's argument that the public policy
protecting employees from false employer representations should be
sufficient to overcome their at will terminability. The court cited
Shapiro, Mallard, and Pugh in cautioning that
[a]lthough there is dictum in Tameny suggesting that there can be a public
policy sufficient to support a cause of action for wrongful discharge absent
statutory authority, no California cases have so held ....

Mere allegation

policy violation of a statute does not suffice to state a cause of
of public
action. 8

Khanna and Tyco thus represent essentially opposite decisions
made by two courts of appeal at almost the same time. The decisions
appear to be based upon the application of two different strands of
wrongful discharge theory unraveled from the Tameny case. The
California Supreme Court has not yet attempted to reconcile or redirect the courts of appeal as they continue to explore, vary, and modify the ambiguous directives of the Tameny opinion. 99 Thus, the
Inc., after the trial court summarily overruled its demurrer to a wrongful discharge complaint brought by former employee Richards.
96. Plaintiffs theory of liability was premised on Tyco's alleged violation of CAL.
LAB. CODE § 970 (West Supp. 1986), which reads in pertinent part:

No person,. . . shall influence, persuade, or engage any person to change...
from any place outside [California] to any place within the state ...

for the

pupose of working in any branch of labor, through or by means of knowingly
false representations, whether spoken [or] written ....
(emphasis added).
97. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege knowingly false representations by Tyco, and thus failed to state a cause of action under Labor Code section 970.
164 Cal. App. 3d at 157, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
98. Id. at 160, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47, (citing Shapiro, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 477,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 613) (emphasis added). The court of appeal found that the trial court
had abused its discretion in overruling Tyco's demurrer, and granted Tyco's writ of
mandamus.
99. The case of Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation, 184 Cal. App. 3d 241, 219
Cal. Rptr. 866, review granted, 712 P.2d 891, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1986) represents the
supreme court's first return to the wrongful discharge area since its 1980 decision in
Tameny. The case involves the discharge of Daniel Foley, branch manager of a financial
information agency, who was fired after reporting to company executives that his supervisor had been discharged from a previous position and was suspected of embezzlement.
Interactive Data Corporation (IDC) contends that Foley's discharge related to his substandard work; Foley argues that his work was exemplary, winning him two company
awards and a $6700 merit bonus two days before he was fired, and that his discharge
was wrongful - resulting not only despite, but because of his good faith attempts to

dimensions of wrongful discharge as defined in that case continue to
expand and contract by turn, increasingly devoid of an ascertainable
focus or direction.
PROPOSED:

A "NO-CAUSE" DISCHARGE STATUTE

The Need for an Alternative
It is now nearly forty years since the Kouff decision first announced the conditional status of section 2922, and qualified the previously unconditional right of an employer to discharge at will employees. State and federal courts have been seeking an appropriate
standard and perspective to define those conditions and qualifications
ever since.10 0

By and large, their efforts have failed. On an ad hoc basis judicial
decisions have protected individual at will employees from various
objectionable, unethical, discriminatory, retaliatory, or arbitrary dismissals by employers, notwithstanding the absence of such protection
in the contract terms between them. 01 In other cases just as equitably demanding, that protection has been withheld. 0 2 California
courts have used a host of different approaches to articulate a vague
middle ground between prohibiting and allowing termination at will.
maintain IDC's reputation within the financial community.
The case presents several issues for resolution by the supreme court. Longevity of employment, as a factor contributing to the employee's right to employment, has perplexed
the courts of appeal ever since Tameny. Foley had worked for IDC for only six years and
nine months. Another aspect of the case involves IDC's policy of maintaining written
disciplinary guidelines for employees, including a seven-step termination procedure. It
did not follow those procedures in Foley's case; the court may address Cleary and its
holding that such procedures suggest or prove a covenant to discharge for cause only.
Finally, there is no statute at issue in the case either requiring Foley to act, or prohibiting IDC from firing him because of his disclosures. As in the Tameny case, therefore, the
court will be faced with defining public policy in the absence of statute.
The supreme court's ruling may alter, amend, or even help to clarify the law of wrongful discharge. However, it will just as surely spawn another several years of appeals court
renderings that diverge and reform it. It will not prevent the need or incentive to litigate
issues surrounding ambiguous discharges. The court will not likely return to the doctrinal
rigidity of Petermann; thus, it can only discuss, and not define, the degree of "fundamentality" necessary before public policy outlaws a termination. It may limit but will not
refute the good faith covenant, so the covenant too will remain inherently incapable of
definition.
In short, the supreme court will add to the encyclopedic case law of wrongful discharge. However, it cannot provide a formula that prospectively defines the permissible
from the impermissible discharge, while simultaneously protecting its polition as the
guardian of employee interests and public policies not defined or explicitly formulated.
Thus, it will not resolve the inherent inconsistencies in the law, or the need for an alternative. See infra note 105; see also Justices Measure Employer's Rights In At-Will
Firings, L.A. Daily J., June 16, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
100. See supra notes 18-66 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199
Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984).
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The benchmark wrongful discharge cases provide no coherent
methodology for assessing the legality or wrongfulness of at will employee discharge within that middle ground. Rather, their teachings
are contradictory and divergent. Cleary and Pugh suggest certain
factors tending to indicate an employee's reasonable expectancy of
discharge for good cause only. However, those cases illuminate the
inconsistency in the law more than they suggest a solution. They
treat circumstantial factors of employment very differently in coming to radically contrasting conclusions about the reasons for, and
the degree of, employer liability in the wrongful discharge setting.
Khanna and Shapiro take their separate paths as distinctive reflections of Cleary's expansiveness and Pugh's restrictiveness. The other
cases discussed fall somewhat in the muddled middle ground.
All stepchildren of the Tameny decision, they provide little insight
into what constitutes public policy sufficient to disallow at will discharge, or how powerful the covenant of good faith is in requiring
employers to discharge for good cause, or what circumstances in an
employment relationship modify a terminable at will agreement between the parties. The so-called "California Rule," much-heralded
as creating a good faith, public policy overlay on all aspects of the
employment relationship, is not a rule or even a series of rules at all.
There is no sustaining logic in the California decisions, and no guidelines of any predictive value for employer and employee to follow in
establishing mutually acceptable terms for employee termination.
The protracted, expensive litigation that results yields little for employer or employee in the workplace. 103
Still, the perceived need for judicial oversight in at will employment disputes remains. So long as an employer retains the right to
dismiss an employee without cause, termination remains possible for
what will be recognized as objectionable or unfair reasons. Inevitably, such causes will not have been recognized and prohibited by the
103. Meanwhile, the issue of tort liability remains unresolved and untested, and
continues to threaten to raise the litigation stakes in wrongful discharge. Khanna is a
case in point; the court of appeal acknowledged Tameny, and recognized tort liability in
theory, but proceeded to affirm a small jury verdict representing only those compensatory
damages tied to Khanna's lost commission profits. The jury awarded no punitive damages. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d 257-58, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864; see supra notes 90-93
and accompanying text. Thus, the court of appeal relied on tort principles, but affirmed a
damage award based upon breach of contract.
No other decision in the wake of Tameny and Cleary has been premised on tort liability, although the courts routinely acknowledge the existence of the tort theory alternative. No case therefore has squarely confronted the liability or damage award ramifications of that doctrine as yet.

legislature with the clarity or specificity of its current declarations
against discriminatory or retaliatory discharge.104 The potential for
employer abuse of the at will discharge power poses a threat of employee victimization that California courts historically have been reluctant to tolerate10 and
that the state supreme court in Tameny cate5
gorically refuted.
104. Professor Summers suggests that the justification for
legal protection
"should need no argument. Beyond the claim to equal treatment issuch
the demand for sim-

ple justice and due process when an employee's valuable right is at stake

-

his right to

his job." Summers, supra note 11, at 133. It is such a recognition of inarticulated, but
overseeing principles of "justice" that fuels the argument for judicial creativity in supplementing the employee protection statutes.
Professor Blades, in his seminal 1967 article, further expounded upon the need to recognize principles of essential fairness which are impossible to catalogue or define through
legislation, when he argued:
[T]he impossibility of defining with precision the scope of the employer's appropriate control over the employee is insufficient reason for treating that control as boundless . .

.

.The difficulty in drawing a line might warrant conced-

ing much that is arguable. But numerous demands an employer might make of
his employee, when weighed against the interests of the employee as an individual, are clearly not justified by the employer's legitimate concerns . . . .To
catalog in advance all the various facets of an employee's life which ought to
be immune from intrusion by the employer would be impossible. Such a list
could only be supplied . . . through a process of continuing judicial

elaboration.
Blades, supra note 11, at 1407.
105. The Tameny court saw itself as demonstrating a "continuing judicial recognition of the fact

. . .

that '[t]he days when a servant was practically the slave of his

master have long since passed.'" 27 Cal. 3d at 179, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845 (citing Greene
v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 26 Cal. 2d 245, 251, 157 P.2d 367, 370 (1945)). Notwithstanding the court's insistence that its activism was unexceptional, the California approach contrasts vividly with that of the judiciary in other states. A recent and notable
example is provided by the New York courts. In 1983, in Murphy v. American Home
Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 448 N.E. 2d 86, 461 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (1983) the New York
Court of Appeals refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge absent
specific statutory authority. The court insisted that modifying the doctrine of employment at will was a legislative responsibility. Though sympathetic to the argument that
"the [at-will] rule yields harsh results for those employees who do not enjoy the benefits
of express contractual limitations on the power of dismissal," it concluded:
Whether these conclusions are supportable or whether for other compelling
reasons employers, should, as a matter of policy, be held liable to at will employees discharged under circumstances for which no liability has existed at
common law, are issues better left for resolution at the hands of the
Legislature.

Id. at 301, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235 (emphasis added). The court thus
denied relief to an employee who had alleged discharge on the basis of his age, and in
retaliation for his report to company personnel of accounting improprieties.
The court expressed great reservations about the status of the at will doctrine in New
York. Nevertheless, it emphasized the advantage of legislation over judicial action in
framing the necessary limitations on discharge at will. It concluded that employment at
will should be limited in the light of "public ventilation, rather than in consequence of
judicial resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants." Id. at
303, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
Since Murphy, courts in New York have summarily rejected claims of wrongful discharge. See, e.g., Silverman v. Wilmit, 97 A.D.2d 507, 464 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1983); Bergamini v. Manhattan & Bronx S.T.D.A. Surface Transit, 94 A.D.2d 441, 463 N.Y.2d
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Thus the need continues for a mechanism by which employers and
employees may fairly, routinely, efficiently, and nonlitigiously settle
potential disputes surrounding at will terminations.
The Statutory Proposal
Legislation is therefore proposed which does not attempt to redefine good cause or add to the list of explicitly prohibited reasons for
discharge. Such measures only recast the current, unsuccessful trend
in the California cases. Rather, a "no-cause discharge"10 6 is suggested, created by statute and available as an optional, binding contractual alternative to litigation, which would resolve the termination
dispute independent of the issue of the employee's at will status, or
the lawfulness of the cause for termination.
The no-cause discharge option would be initiable either by the employer or as a response by an employee notified of employer's intent
to terminate for good cause. If accepted, the no-cause discharge
would constitute a final, binding accord between the parties by which
both would waive rights to litigate the discharge. It would avoid altogether the merits of the employer's reasons for dismissing the employee, in favor of the employer's payment of a statutorily defined
and calculated discharge payment which would accrue throughout
the duration of the worker's employment.
If the parties choose not to offer or accept the no-cause optiorp,
they remain free to pursue all current remedies for wrongful discharge, including the tort and contract actions for wrongful discharge and those statutory remedies created at the state and federal
level for specific wrongful discharge claims. In such a case, the onus
would remain on the employee to successfully allege the wrongfulness of the discharge. The defense of ust cause discharge, however,
would remain available to the employer.
The critical difference for an employer rejecting the no-cause dis777 (1983), rev'd in part, 62 N.Y.2d 897, 467 N.E.2d 521, 478 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1984).
But cf. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193 (1982) (exception to the at will rule recognized based upon an employer's handbook,
found to constitute part of the contract between the parties such that handbook promises
of discharge for cause overcame the rebuttable presumption of employee's at will terminability). The state legislature has yet to address the court of appeals' concerns about the
vulnerability of New York's at will employees.
106. Obviously, an employee terminable at will is also one terminable for "no
cause." However, the term is used here to distinguish the proposed mechanism from "bad
cause" or wrongful discharge, and good cause, now routinely claimed by employers even
where dismissal is supposedly at will and requires no showing of cause. See supra note
48.

charge option would be that it could not subsequently defend a discharge on the basis that the employment was one at will, subject to
discharge without cause. Thus, the no-cause discharge and payment
mechanism becomes the sole method by which an employer may fire
107
at will.

The Model Statute
To introduce the concept of the no-cause discharge and discharge
payment, an illustrative statute is set forth below. The procedures for
developing the no-cause theory are not limited to those included in
the statute: in particular, the "Discharge Payment" formula developed by the statute is flexible, subject to additional or different variables as well as to the development of a multiplier constant by which
the final "Discharge Payments" would be calculated.
THE MODEL CALIFORNIA No-CAUSE DISCHARGE AND PAYMENT

ACT
1. Title. The title of this Act shall be the California No-Cause Discharge
and Payment Act ("Act").
2. Purpose. The purpose of the Act shall be to provide to the parties to an
employment contract a procedure whereby the employer may discharge the
employee from employment without cause, by paying to the employee a
discharge payment separate and distinct from any other payment, salary,
bonus, serverance sum, or pension interest, as calculated by the formula(s)
set forth in this Act and subject to the conditions and procedures established in this Act.108
3. No-cause payment proposal by an employer upon discharge. An employer, whether or not otherwise subject to terms of an employment contract with an employee specifying or implying discharge only in the case of
just cause, may propose to terminate the employee without cause and upon
payment of the full amount of the "Discharge Payment" calculated according to the formula set forth in section 6 of this Act. 10 9 The no-cause discharge and payment proposal shall be in writing, and shall be signed by the
employer. 110
107. This is not to imply that at will employment is less available to an employer.
In fact, the proposal expands the potential use of the no-cause termination option, since
it may be recognized by the agreement of the parties even where a length of employment
might otherwise be interpreted as guaranteed to the employee by contract. However, a
specific termination at will clause in an employment agreement would automatically impose the statutory mechanism. That is, an employee explicitly terminable at will could
not be discharged without cause unless the discharge payment accompanied the
discharge.
108. The no-cause discharge payment would remain distinguishable from all related payments or benefits accruing to an employee upon retirement or discharge. The
discharge payment would supplant, rather than supplement, many of these payments for
the at will employee, particularly the employee not qualifying for pension benefits.
109. Thus, the no-cause discharge option is available to the parties as the sole,
statutory alternative to those terms establishing duration of employment in the contract.
As set forth in section 4 of the Act, the option may be proposed by the employee as well
as the employer. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
110. The no-cause discharge and payment proposal itself would require little atten-
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4. No-cause discharge and payment proposal by an employee upon discharge. An employee subject to termination by an employer for alleged
good cause, whether or not subject to terms of an employment contract with
an employer specifying or implying discharge only in the case of good
cause, may propose to submit to termination without cause and upon payment of the full amount of the "Discharge Payment" calculated according
to the formula set forth in section 6 of this Act. The no-cause discharge and
payment proposal shall be in writing, and shall be signed by the employee.
5. Response to the no-cause payment proposal. The party receiving a nocause discharge and payment proposal pursuant to section 3 or 4 of this Act
shall have a reasonable amount of time as specified in the proposal within
which to accept or reject the proposal. The recipient of the proposal must
give notice in writing of its acceptance or rejection, and shall be presumed
to understand the terms and consequences of the choice to accept or
reject."'
a. Acceptance. Acceptance of the proposal for no-cause discharge and
payment shall constitute an absolute waiver by the parties of all legally
recognized claims to just or wrongful discharge, and shall result in the employer's obligation to pay to the employee the full "Discharge Payment"
calculated according to the formula set forth in section 6 of the Act. 1 2
b. Rejection. Rejection of the proposal for a no-cause discharge and payment shall be deemed final, and shall constitute an absolute waiver by the
parties of the no-cause discharge and payment option set forth in this Act.
Failure by a party to respond to a no-cause discharge and payment proposal, or the filing of a cause of action based upon the discharge, shall be
tion to terms, and would constitute more of a notice than a definitive or final statement of
payment obligations. With the exception of the "Work Quality" (WQ) factor, moreover,
the variable amounts contributing to the discharge payment calculation are objectively
discoverable and easily calculated. Thus, the proposal form could easily be standardized,
significant only insofar as it indicated compliance with the time limits obtaining for use
of the no-cause discharge and payment process. See infra note 115 and accompanying
text.
111. The writing requirement is another easily standardized procedural mechanism. However, some procedure might be provided by which a proposal recipient could
request a clarification of the terms and calculations in the proposal, or, for good cause
shown, request a reasonable extension of time in which to choose to accept or reject its
terms.
112. As set forth in section 2 of the Act, the ultimate purpose of the no-cause
discharge and payment option is to provide an expeditious, efficient alternative to a prolonged dispute between employers and discharged employees. Essential to the success of
such an approach is the speed and completeness of the termination transactions, including immediate and full payment to the discharged employee.
The payment sum for a long-term employee with a satisfactory work record can be
significant, easily exceeding a year's wages depending upon the value of the Payment
Multiplier (PM) used in section 6 of the Act. The immediate payment obligation of such
a large amount, particularly for a smaller employer, may make the discharge payment
unaffordable. This can inure either to the benefit or the detriment of the employee. The
employer may simply choose to retain the employee, thus providing a measure of employment security not otherwise available to the at will worker. In some cases, however, the
cost of a no-cause discharge may so exceed the costs of litigating a discharge for cause
that the employer might opt to litigate a discharge dispute otherwise resolvable. In such
instances, arbitration to reduce the discharge payment, or to arrange for a periodic payment schedule, might resolve the employer's payment dilemma and protect the employee's payment interest.

deemed a rejection of the proposal as set forth in this subsection.," 8
6. Calculationof the DischargePayment. The Discharge Payment payable
to an employee upon acceptance of the no-cause discharge and payment
option shall be calculated according to the following formula:11 4
Discharge Payment (DP) = YA x YE x SA x WQ x [PM]
The variables included in the Discharge Payment calculation formula are
defined as follows:
YA: Years of Age of employee at the time of the no-cause discharge and
payment proposal, rounded to the nearest tenth of a year.
YE: Years of Employment of employee by employer at the time of the
no-cause discharge and payment proposal, rounded to the nearest tenth of a
year.
SA: Salary Average computed over the full YE period, based upon the
average of the computed annual salary for each year of such employment.
WQ: Work Quality factor for the employee, which shall be 1.0 if there
are no substantial or significant demotions, sanctions, or reprimands in the
employment history of the employee as made known to the employee by
routine, generally applicable employment relations procedures, and .80 if
such substantial or significant demotions, sanctions or reprimands exist in
the employment history of the employee.
[PM]: the Payment Multiplier, a constant by which the YA, YE, SA and
WQ shall be multiplied to yield the final Discharge Payment (DP) sum.
7. DischargePayment Calculation Disputes. Disputes between the parties
concerning the proper calculation of the Discharge Payment to the employee shall be subject to good faith, reasonable settlement by and between
the parties. If the parties cannot reach agreement on the Discharge Payment amount, such dispute shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration, the arbitrator to approve either the discharge amount calculation submitted by the employer or employee.115

113. Once again, the rationale to support the finality of the parties' decision to
enter into a no-cause agreement is the need for efficiency and certainty in termination
situations. In order to fulfill those objectives, the no-cause proposal cannot be a continuously available alternative to the employer and employee, resurrected by one or the other
party after final termination or as a potential response to developing strengths or weaknesses in the parties' subsequent litigation. Financial or tactical considerations might lead
one or both parties to seek the no-cause alternative as a necessary cost-avoidance measure; but those costs, and the risks and costs of the litigation alternative, are reasonably
constant and discoverable within the time limits suggested in the statute.
114. See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
115. Some of the factors included in determining the final discharge payment
amount will inevitably be subject to varying calculation by employer and employee. Such
issues as whether to include only years of continuous, uninterrupted employment in the
YE figure, how to recognize employment within various divisions or subsidiaries of a
corporation, how or whether to include leaves of absence, are areas of potential dispute
which legislation cannot ever clarify without exception, and which some form of resolution must exist to resolve.
Even more subject to disagreement between the parties is the \VQ factor, which creates only two alternative categories translating into alternative factor values of 1.0 or .8.
Where employee evaluations and supervisory assessments yield a file containing both positive and negative characterizations of the employee's work quality, conclusions about the
employee's performance will be arguable at best. The file may be ambiguous, incomplete,
or incorrect, and the employee may thus seek to supplement or dispute the WQ factor
assessment by the employer. Such disputes, if not informally resolvable, are easily subject
to expedited presentation before an arbitrator, and to final and binding decision. Thus,
minor disagreements concerning the employee's work quality and longevity may affect
the final determination of the discharge payment, without requiring the parties to abandon the no-cause alternative altogether. See infra note 120.
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Discussion

The concept of required discharge payments is novel, but not without precedent. Various forms of payment to discharged employees

have evolved in Europe and the industrialized nations, absent the

need to prove wrongfulness in the discharge.1 16 The territorial stat-

utes of Puerto Rico provide statutory compensation for any employee
indefinite term contract who is discharged without good
under11an
7

cause.

116. For a summary of statutory protections extended to dismissed at will employees in France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden, see Summers, supra note 11, at
508-19. Professor Summers suggests that while western European countries have followed the general principle that employment for an indefinite period could be terminated
at will, most now require "reasonable notice" to discharged employees in the absence of
serious employee misconduct. Employees are not given a lump sum payment upon termination, but are guaranteed paid employment for that period of time between the notice of
termination and actual discharge. The reasonable notice period, which may be months
long in duration, effectively creates a specific term of employment upon which the at will
employee may rely in the absence of clearly egregious conduct warranting immediate
dismissal.
See also Bellace, Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT. L. 413, 426-38
(1984) [hereinafter Bellace, Employment Protection] (discussing the Redundancy Payments Act in Great Britain for employees dismissed for lack of need, payable in a lump
sum as a financial cushion to soften the blow of unemployment and based upon employee's age, length of service, and a normal week's wages); Bellace, A Right of Fair
Dismissal:Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 210-17 (1983)
(summarizing the International Labor Organization Convention requiring employees of
ratifying nations to be extended discharge rights including due process before termination, reasonable notice and/or payment upon discharge, and a requirement of good cause
to justify the discharge. The United States was one of only seven countries out of a total
of 126 nations to object to the Convention); Committee on Labor and Employment Law,

At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 Rec. A.B. City N.Y.

170, 175-80 (1981) (summarizing development in Europe, Japan, Algeria, Egypt and
Canada of advance notice and adjustment payments); Steiber, Protection Against Unfair
Dismissal. A Comparative View (Paper presented to International Industrial Relations
Association, 5th World Congress in Paris) (Sept. 3-7, 1979) (offering a comparison of
North and South American, and European, employee protection against wrongful
discharge).
117. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185 (Supp. 1983). The Territorial Legislature enacted the statute in 1976, including in its provisions a detailed six-part definition of good
cause for termination, and defining termination "without good cause" as a "discharge
made by mere whim or fancy of the employer or without cause related to the proper and
normal operation of the establishment." An employee under an indefinite term employment contract who is discharged without good cause is entitled by terms of the statute to
compensation upon discharge in the amount of one month's salary, plus one week of
salary for each year of service. This payment has been held to be the exclusive remedy
for an employee discharged "without good cause" in the absence of a specific federal or
territorial statutory prohibition of discha'rge made wrongfully or in bad faith. See, e.g.,
Lugo v. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 638 (D.P.R. 1984); Rivera v. Security Life Ins. Co., 106 P.R. Dec. 517 (1977). The Puerto Rico statute thus differs significantly from the California no-cause discharge proposal, which would allow wrongful dis-

However, the California no-cause discharge option would be distinguishable from previous approaches in several important ways.
First, calculation of the payment amount would take into account
the principal equitable factors which the California courts now recognize as significant in determining the employee's at will status:
longevity of service by the employee, as recognized in Cleary, and

the presence of commendations, or absence of demotions or criticisms, tending to show a satisfactory work product, as emphasized in
Pugh.1"'

Second, the payment formula calculation would reflect several factors of fundamental concern in the worker protection area, but not
recognized outright by the California cases. Chief among these is the
discharged employee's age. 119 A related factor is the full work record
of the employee, although the model statute restricts the work record

inquiry to sanctions - as such failing to distinguish between the
satisfactory and the better than satisfactory worker.120
charge litigation to proceed if the no-cause option were not mutually agreeable to
employer and employee.
118. Neither the courts of appeal in Cleary and Pugh, nor the subsequent cases
deriving from them, have recognized any other factors tending to overcome the presumption of at will terminability. Khanna argued that the Cleary and Pugh factors were not
the exclusive indicia of employment terminable only for just cause, but the court of appeal did not suggest alternative or additional factors. Future cases will probably announce new elements critical in the wrongful discharge analysis. See supra note 99. Once
so recognized, those additional indicia could easily be factored into the no-cause discharge formula.
119. Although the employee's age is an indirectly included element in considerations of job longevity, the no-cause proposal includes an independent factor incrementally
increasing the no-cause discharge payment based upon age alone. Thus, two employees
differing in age, but with otherwise identical work histories, would be subject to different
discharge payments, the older of the two employees receiving progressively higher payments depending upon his or her more advanced age.
120. There is perhaps no more difficult qualitative factor to assess in the employment relationship than that of employee job performance. For that reason, the WQ factor, which quantifies an essentially subjective issue, is limited to two alternatives. Either
the record of the employee is satisfactory, or it is not, with the characterization having a
.2, or 20%, net effect on the employee's discharge payment sum.
This is the area in which arbitration may see its most necessary and frequent use.
Resolution of disputes involving job performance, however, are designed to be straightforward. Degrees of employer satisfaction with the employee's work are avoided, in favor
of a simple, dichotomous distinction between competent and unacceptable work product.
Documented, substantial employer dissatisfaction with the employee would yield a 20%
reduction in the final discharge payment amount for the terminated employee. The arbitrator would not be required to find documentation of employee competency or employer
satisfaction to assign the 1.0 value. Only upon a showing of documented, significant employer dissatisfaction, effectively communicated, could the employer validly assign the
lower .8 WQ value.
The employer seeking a no-cause discharge premised on a reduced discharge payment
would be required, therefore, to record and give notice of his dissatisfaction and reprimands. This documentation and communication requirement should have singularly beneficial effects in the workplace.
Inevitably, arbitration will involve employee work histories documenting both positive
and negative incidents of employment; the arbitrator will be required to deem the em-
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These are the critical indicia of employee reliability, faithfulness
and vulnerability that California decisions have relied upon, explicitly or implicitly, in determining whether to allow an at will discharge. However, the no-cause proposal avoids the vagueness and inconsistency the courts have encountered in incorporating such
equitable considerations into the fabric of general public policy, or
implied contract terms, or the tort-based covenant of good faith. Instead, it quantifies them and derives from them a calculable cost of
termination upon which both employer and employee may rely,
which simply and efficiently avoids litigation, and which would allocate the cost of termination as an employee benefit.
The proposed formula differs from severance pay and existing
statutory payments to employees in several other ways as well. The
amount of the payment available to the discharged employee - in
particular, the long-term older employee with an untarnished work
record - would be significantly greater than the usual severance or
statutory payment. 121 Moreover, the discharge payment depends
neither upon the beneficence of the employer, or upon a contractual
ployee's performance as satisfactory or unacceptable, when it is neither. The result will
dissatisfy either the employer or employee. However, the proportion of the difference
between a positive and negative determination is small enough to minimize inequity
caused by the arbitration decision. It will at least yield a reduced payment to the employee whose work history is ambiguous, but does not merit dismissal. At the same time,
the 20% reduction in the discharge payment for discharges involving documented poor
performance reduces the payment burden on the employer, and may provoke reduced nocause discharges and payments rather than litigated dismissals for cause.
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. The payment provisions of Puerto
Rico's employee discharge statute provide incremental advances based solely upon years
of service. The increase in the payments is relatively restrictive. An employee discharged
without good cause after 25 years of service receives only one month plus 25 weeks pay,
or slightly over six months payment, no matter how creditable his or her employment
record.
The provisions of Great Britain's Redundancy Payments Act are somewhat more generous, and establish three age categories for employees such that the oldest age group
receives the highest payments. Employees under the act receive half a week's pay for
each year of service between ages 18 and 21; one week's pay for each year of service
between ages 22 and 40; and one and one-half week's pay for each year of service when
the employee is over 40. For persons with greater than 20 years of service to an employer
the calculation is based only on the last 20 years of service. Bellace, Employment Protection, supra note 116, at 436.
Thus, an employee beginning work at age 18 and working 25 years for the same employer (thus discharged at age 43) would receive payment for the years of service from
age 23 to 43. The sum due would represent some 24 weeks of employment. An employee
providing the same 25 years of service from age 40 to 65 would be due 30 weeks' payment. As with the formula governing such payments in Puerto Rico, the discharge payment represents about six months of pay. The English statute, however, applies only to a
narrow category of employees whose discharge is related to the absence of work and the
need for laying off workers. It is not applied in the at will context generally.

agreement for severance pay. Subject only to the parties' election to
pursue the wrongful discharge litigation alternative, payment would
be immediate and mandatory.
Perhaps most significantly, however, the no-cause discharge alternative would not disturb the current wrongful discharge law in California. The employer intending to discharge an at will employee for
a recognized just cause would remain free to do so. The employee
desiring to pursue a wrongful discharge claim could so proceed, regardless of a no-cause discharge alternative. The current public policy prohibitions against discriminatory or retaliatory employee discharge related to race, creed, color, age, gender, veteran status,
"whistle-blowing," public service, and union membership and activity would continue to constitute grounds for wrongful discharge
liability.
From a pure cost-risk standpoint, the incentive to avoid litigation
would increase with the size of the discharge payment available to
an employee, even in cases where the employee's discharge was probably wrongful. Some cases clearly yielding wrongful discharge damages thus would not be prosecuted. Litigation in which the wrongfulness of the discharge claim was not clear would similarly invite use
of the no-cause discharge alternative. 122 While this might affect the
amount of discharge litigation, it would not substantively affect the
rights of the parties to litigate. Its only effect would be to ensure that
the wrongfully discharged employee would not be required to bring
suit in order to receive some compensation for his or her loss of
employment.
Another significant advantage of the no-cause discharge alternative is that it redirects the current transactional costs of employee
termination generally, and at will employee termination in particular, and defers litigation expenses for payments made directly to the
employee. In cases involving the older and longer-working employee,
in fact, it may result in a discharge payment greater than the pro122. Beyond the scope of this Article, but a necessary consideration in the effective
development of no-cause discharge legislation, is the effect of prior and subsequent federal employee protection statutes in a state legislatively providing for no-cause discharge
agreements between an employer and employee. For a discussion of federal labor law
policy and its effect on state-created remedies for wrongful discharge, see Browne &
Wheeler, Federal Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1
(1986). While that article is principally concerned with conflict between federal arbitration law and the law of wrongful discharge in the states, it emphasizes that in all cases if
state law "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,' and actual conflict will be found," and the state law
will be preempted. Id. at 5 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). The
economic incentive to enter into a no-cause discharge and payment agreement should
result in instances of its use even though the discharge is for a cause proscribed by federal law. If the purpose of the federal (or state) legislation is thereby frustrated, the nocause discharge may be vulnerable to a preemption claim.
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jected expense of a litigated termination. 123 However, the discharge

payment still remains the more reliable, fixed cost for termination,
comparing favorably to the less accurately calculable cost of wrong-

ful discharge litigation. Moreover, it imposes direct financial responsibility upon the employer for providing what often becomes a living
stipend for the discharged employee. These costs are incompletely
and less efficiently provided by unemployment compensation, when
such compensation is available, and even more inefficiently and inconsistently supplied by the courts.124
Discharge Payment Computations and the "PM" Factor

Most of the variables contained in the discharge payment formula
are readily ascertainable, and, where subject to dispute can be expeditiously resolved through arbitration. However, the final Discharge
Payment (DP) calculation is critically dependent upon the assigned
value of a "Payment Multiplier" [PM] factor. The [PM] value is

that numerical coefficient, independent of the objective criteria upon
which the remaining DP variables depend, which becomes the final
legislative control over how much an employee is paid upon discharge. The assigned [PM] value thus becomes the focal point for
legislative consideration in quantifying the no-cause discharge
option.
As illustration, consider forty-five year old Employee A, with an
uninterrupted and unblemished employment record of twenty years
and an average annual salary over those years of $25,000. The DP
calculation for A, independent of the [PM] value, would be calcu123. Professor Harrison has argued that employers will treat the loss of the right
to terminate at will without a discharge payment as a cost, even though it may be a more
efficient cost. As such, imposition of the proposal may marginally reduce employee demand, as well as be financed by a reduction in concurrent employee benefits - in particular, the employee wage. Harrison, An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, supra note
3, at 356-62. However, the value of job security that employees will place on employment
subject to the no-cause discharge should offset these costs, that is, fewer and lower-paying jobs.
124. Id. Professor Harrison further comments:
The goal of efficiency ... does not appear to be well-suited for judicial action
A legislative setting is more appropriate for the collection and study of
....
the types of economic data needed to identify changes that actually do have the
The preferred version of legislative action
desired economic effects ....
would be one that reduces transaction costs. This approach would ensure that
only efficient exchanges take place and would change the focus of the efficiency
issue. Transaction costs would not be eliminated, but merely transferred to the
public sector. The issue would remain whether the public investment would
generate sufficient returns to recommend it.
Id. at 358, 359 n.161.

lated as follows:
DP(A) = YA x YE x SA x WQ x [PM] = (45) x (20) x (25,000) x (1) x
[PM]= 22,500,000 x [PM]

Assigning a [PM] value of .0011 to the formula, A would receive the
sum of $25,000, or the average salary figure of one year, as discharge payment. 12 5 Assuming an increasing salary for employees
over the term of employment, that amount would probably represent
significantly less than the annual salary of the employee at the time
of discharge. At a [PM] value of .002, the DP amount would rise to
$45,000; and that DP value would increase or decrease proportionally for greater or lesser [PM] values.
For Employee B, possessing the same work record and salary but
being age fifty-five at termination, the amounts involved would be
significantly higher:
DP(B) = YA x YE x SA x WQ x [PM]= (55) x (20) x (25,000) x (1) x
[PM] = 27,500,000 x [PM]

yielding DP sums of $27,500 and $55,000 for the same [PM] values
of .0011 and .002, respectively.
Obviously, each year of employment incrementally increases each
of the variables contributing to the DP calculation. The YA and YE
factors increase arithmetically, and the SA value is dependent upon
the average annual salary increases earned by the employee. 120 For
the competent, older, loyal employee, continuous employment thus
"earns" an increasingly accelerating no-cause discharge payment
sum, the dual effect of which is an increase in the employee's job
security, and a warranted postemployment benefit upon discharge
for no cause.
How much that security and pension should be worth in dollars is
an essentially legislative, and inevitably political, issue finally expressed in the assigned [PM] value for the no-cause discharge. There
is no single methodology for creating a "just" [PM] figure. In fact,
the legislature might well perceive the need to establish different val125. The one year average salary value is used simply as a benchmark, providing a
point of reference for establishing [PM] values. A more meaningful reference point for
employers and employees might be that [PM] value resulting in payment of a full year's
current salary to the employee. For the limited purposes of illustrating the DP formula,
however, the annual payment history and current salaries of fictional employees A and B
have not been supplied.
126. The net result of the arithmetical increase of several factors is a greater than
arithmetical increase in the discharge payment. Thus as an illustration, an employee discharged after 20 years' employment would not simply receive twice the amount he or she
would have received upon discharge after 10 years. Assuming no change in the quality of
the employee's job performance, discharge after 20 years would yield a discharge payment 2.67 times the payment after 10 years. Assuming the further probability that a
worker's average annual salary after 20 years is higher than that after 10 years, the
difference between the two discharge payments for the two would be even greater, in
direct proportion to the difference in the average annual salary figures.
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ues for different industries and professions, depending upon numerous distinguishing factors for a particular type of employment: average period of continuous employment in the job sector considered;
the magnitude or disparity in wage increases within or between job
types; the presence and accessiblity of pension benefits within a particular industry (offsetting the immediacy of the need for the nocause discharge payment); the potential of the discharged employee

to find substitute work; and the expectation of job security within the
type of employment involved. Such categorical distinctions under-

score the flexibility of the no-cause discharge payment formula, as
well as the principles underlying it. More importantly, they would
focus legislative attention on the need to establish [PM] values sensilight of the variable needs of a diverse and changing
tively and in 127
labor market.

Regardless of the method for establishing the [PM] value(s), or

the amount of the discharge payment that the [PM] value yields, the
no-cause discharge payment formula retains its flexibility for adjustment through change in the constant. As additional indicia of the at
will employment relationship are granted circumstantial significance
by courts in wrongful discharge litigation, those factors may be
quantified and factored into the discharge payment computation
along with job longevity, age, and work quality. Any such change in
the formula could, once again, be controlled by the [PM] value.
Thus, the legislature, employers and employees may continue to
127. The principal California wrongful discharge cases suggest that California
courts have not appreciated the need to distinguish between the very different labor markets involved in litigation. Thus the job longevity of a real estate vice-president, in Shapiro, can be subjected to absolute comparison with that of the blue-collar airline worker
in Cleary, or the industrial manager in Pugh, with no further judicial inquiry into the
average employment life for the different positions, or the expectations deriving from the
three very different career tracks involved.
Nevertheless, developing the [PM] value to accurately reflect differences in labor markets is even difficult in theory. As the Harrison article notes, "[t]he identification of labor
markets with potential for efficiency, the determination of the quantity of job security
that can be efficiently transferred, and the legislative specification of labor markets in
sufficient detail so as not to affect labor markets in which changes would be inefficient
are problems that would remain formidable." Harrison, An Interest and Cost Incidence

Analysis, supra note 3, at 358-59.

Even if the objective data required for such distinctions could be collected and accurately assessed, the final assignment of a [PM] value ultimately will take on a political
dimension. Neither the efficiency model proposed by Professor Harrison, nor economic
theory justifying the no-cause discharge proposal, can adequately account for the vagaries of such political decisionmaking, and the disparity in discharge payments for different
industries that it could conceivably generate. The strongest argument for a single [PM]
value for no-cause discharges thus might be its insulating effect from particular employment interests, in favor of a constant value applicable across the labor pool.

selectively incorporate judicial developments in wrongful termination
litigation, while compensating terminated employees and protecting
the discharge rights of employers more clearly and efficiently than
does current wrongful discharge litigation.
CONCLUSION

At will termination in California, once granted the unique status
of statutory protection, has been irrevocably and justifiably qualified
and confined by the California legislature and courts. But legislative
prohibitions against specific types of discharge, combined with a judicial insistence that at will termination be subjugated to a variety of
public policy imperatives, have yielded a troubling, ambiguous and
inconsistent law of wrongful discharge. While the at will doctrine
has endured its harshest critics and most intense legal assaults, the
significant decisions in the area provide little guidance or definition
upon which employers or employees can rely in determining when at
will discharge is permitted by contract, or when it is disallowed. The
result is costly litigation that taxes the parties inefficiently and only
marginally protects either of them from the abuses of the other.
The California courts will undoubtedly continue to assess the propriety of employee dismissals, interpret the provisions of employment
contracts, define the standard of duty owed by an employer to an
employee, and recognize new prerogatives of public policy in concert
with the legislature. The ad hoc, piecemeal, retrospective nature of
its directives will just as certainly continue to confound employers
and employees.
The no-cause discharge alternative proposed in this Article does
not attempt to recast that process, but rather attempts to provide a
way of avoiding it. It creates a simple, predictable, efficient termination procedure that compensates terminated employees according to
the same elements of the employment relationship that courts have
erratically recognized as suggesting employer liability for discharge.
Rather than establish these criteria as vague standards that may or
may not result in a damage award, the no-cause discharge payment
mechanism defines and quantifies them. The costs of a dismissal become foreseeable, calculable, involve virtually no transactional expenses, and are paid efficiently and directly to the employee.
Finally, the mechanism is vital and flexible enough to be tailored
to the varying demands of different sectors of the employment market. It supplements, rather than replaces, judicial and legislative prohibition of wrongful discharges, allowing termination at will to continue while softening the inequitable results of the at will discharge
doctrine that have so troubled the courts and legislature.

